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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER
OF THE MISSOURI LEGISLATURE TO PROVIDE FOR
VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASES
FRANK W. MILLERt
INTRODUCTION*
Like all public law, the law of crimes and of the procedure for the
trial of them comes in three layers-constitutional, legislative and
judge-made. The rules that determine whether one accused of a par-
ticular offense against the substantive criminal law can be tried in a
particular Missouri county present an interesting, if sometimes per-
plexing, picture of the relationship between the three layers in a rela-
tively narrow area, one compact enough to permit study in depth.
Although the exact status of the venue rules at any given point in
the common law development is not entirely free from doubt, it has
often been said that crimes were treated as local for venue purposes.,
Whether this meant that every essential part of a crime had to occur
in a particular county in order for the grand jury of that county to
return a valid indictment is also not entirely free from question, but
that requirement has frequently been asserted.2 If true, this meant
that a crime whose constituent elements occurred in different counties
could be prosecuted in none of them, and that conclusion has been
f Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
* I wish to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Mr. Moses
Harrison and Mr. Harold Satz, third year students in the School of Law, for
preliminary research efforts in connection with the article. My greatest debt
is to my colleague, Arno C. Becht, who read the manuscript and contributed
innumerable valuable suggestions, editorial and otherwise. The responsibility is,
of course, mine.
1. E.g., 1 Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors 27 (8th ed., Ross &
McClure 1923), states that the only non-local common law crime was larceny.
2. "And therefore at the common law, if a man had died in one county of a
stroke received in another, it seems to have been the more general opinion, that
regularly the homicide was indictable in neither of them, because the offense was
not complete in either, and no grand jury could inquire of what happened out
of their own county." 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 301-02 (8th ed., Curwood
1824). And see preamble to 2 and 3 Edw. 6, c. 24 (1547). Compare, 1 East,
Pleas of the Crown 361 (1803): "Where the stroke and death are in different
counties, it was doubtful at common law whether the offender could be indicted
at all, the offence not being complete in either; though the more common opinion
was, that he might be indicted where the stroke was given; ... " East goes on
to refer in a note, however, to the preamble to 2 and 3 Edw. 6, c. 24.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
reached by many of the text-writers.S It is certain, on the other hand,
that courts assert some power to determine which elements of a crime
are "essential" ones. The essential part of the course of criminal con-
duct is sometimes described as its "gist." If every crime has a "gist"
or "kernel," and if that part of it which constitutes the "gist" can
only be committed in one place, it seems obvious that the place where
the "gist" occurs is the proper place of trial.4 This is not to say that
all courts agree precisely what constitutes the gist of each crime,
nor to deny that it is sometimes difficult to prove where the conduct
constituting the gist of the crime actually occurred.
To the extent that courts indulge in fictions of this sort, it seems
clear that the danger that there might be a crime without a situs for
venue purposes-at least where all the facts are known-is not too
great. Perhaps the most accurate general statement of the situation
is that
At common law the jurisdiction of English Courts to try persons
accused of crime is regulated by the following rules:
1. ..
2. Indictments for crimes committed within the realm could
be found and tried only by juries summoned from the
county, liberty, borough, or other judicial area within
3. See note 2 supra.; I Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law
*177-78 (4th Am. ed. 1841). It has also been asserted that this rule was applied
with less rigor in the case of misdemeanors. See Bruce, J., concurring in The
Queen v. Ellis, [1898] 1 Q.B. 230, 242. 1 Russell, op. cit. supra note 1, at 20 says:
"It seems to have been established as a common-law rule that a misdemeanor
committed partly in one county and partly in another could be tried in either
county."
4. See, e.g., the reasoning of Wills, J., in The Queen v. Ellis, supra note 3,
at 237:
The making of the false pretences is antecedent to, and not a part of, the
obtaining the goods. It is a material circumstance, because it stamps the
illegality of the obtaining the goods. The gist and kernel of the offence
is the obtaining the goods by improper means, not in using the improper
means whereby goods were obtained, and there was therefore an entire
offence within the one county, though the circumstance which stamped
it with illegality took place beyond the jurisdiction. (Emphasis added.)
The rule thus announced will be referred to hereafter as the "gist rule."
5. See Model Penal Code § 1.03, comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956):
At common law a prosecution could not be brought except for an
offense the "gist" of which occurred within the prosecuting jurisdiction.
It was, however, proper to look to acts occurring outside to determine
the nature of the offense. Literally applied, the common law rule meant
that an offense was not subject to prosecution in more than one jurisdic-
tion. It thus avoided the problem of multiple conviction or punishment in
different jurisdictions for the same offense. . . . The difficulty came
in determining what constituted the "gist" of the offense.
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which the crime or an integral part of it was alleged to
have been committed... .6 (Emphasis added.)
The statement takes into account the various fictions used by the
courts to solve the problem of venue where the crime was partly com-
mitted in one judicial district and partly in another, although it does
not purport to define the phrase "an integral part of it." In any event,
a study of the Missouri cases, as will become clear in the course of this
article, reveals that the Missouri courts have assumed implicitly the
existence of a common law rule for determining venue which can ac-
curately be described as the "gist" rule.
Each constitution of the State of Missouri has provided that one
accused of crime is entitled to be tried where the crime was com-
mitted. That mandate is clearly stated in article I, section 18 (a) of
the Constitution of 1945 in the same language which appeared in the
Constitution of 1875, its immediate predecessor:
[I]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
... a speedy, public trial by an impartial jury of the county.7
The Constitutions of 18208 and 18659 gave the accused the right "to a
speedy trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage,"'10 but there is no
suggestion in the Missouri cases that the shift from "vicinage" to
"county" changed the rights of the accused.:"
Furthermore, the first two constitutions'12 provided, in effect, that
criminal proceedings must be instituted only by indictment, and the
third" that indictment was the exclusive accusatory process available
in felony cases, though not in misdemeanor cases. These provisions
were ultimately interpreted by the Missouri courts as indirect man-
6. 1 Russell, op. cit. supra note 1, at 20.
7. Mo. Const. art. I, § 18(a); Mo. Const. art. II, § 22 (1875). From the
language alone, it might be argued that the "county" referred to is the one
where the indictment is returned or information filed, regardless of where the
criminal conduct occurred. That contention seems never to have been seriously
advanced in Missouri, and, of course, could be easily refuted historically. See
the full discussion in Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: Constitutional
Vicinage and Venue, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 59 (1944).
8. Mo. Const. art. XIII, § 9 (1820).
9. Mo. Const. art. I, § 18 (1865).
10. Emphasis added.
11. Professor Blume has suggested in another context that the use of the
word "county" in the constitutions of states admitted well after the original
thirteen, in contrast to the use of the word "vicinage" in those of many of
the first states, led to different interpretations of the extent of constitutional
limitations on legislative power to solve venue problems. Blume, supra note 7.
12. Mo. Const. art. XIII, § 14 (1820); Mo. Const. art. I, § 24 (1865).
13. Mo. Const. art. II, § 12 (1875). On November 6, 1900, the Constitution
of 1875 was amended to permit institution of both felony and misdemeanor
prosecutions by information as well as by indictment.
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dates that the trial must be in the county where the crime was com-
mitted, as we shall see.14 Although Missouri constitutions have, since
1900, authorized the institution of both felony and misdemeanor
prosecutions by either indictment or information,', the earlier de-
cisions which utilized the indictment requirement to buttress, if not
bottom, the right to be tried in the county where the crime was com-
mitted,- have still been treated by the Missouri court as providing
additional reasons for interpreting the more recent constitutions as
continuing to impose such a requirement. 7
The purpose of this study is to define the right to trial in the county
where the crime was committed, and, more significantly, to determine
the precise extent to which the constitutional provisions which grant
that right operate as a limitation on the legislative power to provide
for venue in certain kinds of cases which present unusual practical
difficulties.
It is analytically convenient--and, I believe, factually accurate-to
establish three mutually exclusive categories of venue cases:
1. Those in which there is no doubt where every part of the total
course of criminal conduct occurred, and where every part
occurred in a single county.
2. Those in which there is doubt-perhaps not resolvable under
ordinary burden of proof rules-where some significant part
of the total course of criminal conduct occurred.
3. Those in which there is no doubt where every part of the total
course of criminal conduct occurred, but where-at least ac-
cording to some rational view of the matter-some significant
part occurred in one county and another significant part oc-
curred in another county.
To anticipate the conclusion reached in this article, it appears that
the constitutional mandate seriously limits the scope of legislative
power in classes 1 and 2, but not in class 3. To discuss classes 1 and
2 together will contribute to clarity and understanding, so that will
be done first.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Missouri's earliest constitution contained two provisions arguably
relevant to the problem at hand. Article 13, section 9, provided for a
"trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage,"' 8 and article 13, section
14. See discussion in text at notes 32-45 infra.
15. Mo. Const. art. II, § 12 (1875) as amended effective November 6, 1900;
Mo. Const. art. I, § 17.
16. Ex parte Slater, 72 Mo. 102 (1880), the leading case, and other cases
following the Slater case, are discussed infra, text at notes 36-70.
17. The leading case is State v. Anderson, 191 Mo. 134, 90 S.W. 95 (1905),
discussed infra, notes 65-71.
18. Mo. Const. art. XIII, § 9 (1820).
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14, forbade proceeding by information. 19 In addition the Revised
Statutes of 1845 contained several sections providing for venue when
it was uncertain where the acts occurred,2 0 as well as some sections
providing specifically for trial in a county other than that in which
some substantial part of the crime was admittedly committed.21
In the earliest case relevant to this study, one Steerman stole prop-
erty on board a riverboat while making a Mississippi River voyage
from Pike County to St. Louis County. His conviction in St. Louis
County for the larceny committed on the riverboat somewhere in the
course of the voyage, but not necessarily while the boat was in waters
abutting on the shore of St. Louis County, was based on the following
statute:
When any offence shall have been committed within this state
on board of any vessel in the course of any voyage or trip, an in-
dictment for the same may be found, and a trial and conviction
thereon had in any county, through which, or any part of which,
such vessel shall be navigated in the course of the same voyage
or trip, or in the county where such voyage or trip shall termi-
nate, in the same manner, and with like effect, as in the county
where the offence was committed.22
In affirming the conviction, the Missouri Supreme Court said the
common law principle clearly was that venue had to be proved as
laid's-in this instance in St. Louis County. But it held that the legis-
lature was competent to change that principle, and had done so in
many other situations.24 The following facts should be noted: (1) the
prosecution failed to prove that any of the acts constituting the crime
of larceny occurred in the county of trial; (2) the prosecution was
not based on the theory that bringing the fruits of the crime into the
19. Mo. Const. art. XIII, § 14 (1820).
20. Mo. Rev. Stat. c. 138, art. IV, §§ 6, 7 (1845).
21. Mo. Rev. Stat. c. 138, art. IV, §§ 9, 11; c. 47, art. VIII, § 4; c. 47, art.
II, § 42 (1845), are illustrative.
22. Mo. Rev. Stat. c. 138, art. IV, § 6 (1845).
23. Steerman v. State, 10 Mo. 503 (1847).
24. Id. at 506:
This section is not the only anomaly in our criminal code, as for
instance, the receiver of personal property that shall have been feloni-
ously stolen, taken or embezzled, may be indicted, tried and convicted,
in any court in this State, where he received or had such property, no
matter where the theft was committed. So also, where a mortal wound
shall have been inflicted in one county, and death ensues in another,
the indictment, trial, &c., may be had in either county; and where the
wound is inflicted in another State, and death takes place in this State,
the indictment may be found in the county where the death happened.
And a number of other similar statutory provisions might be cited,
passed by the law-making power of the State, and which we apprehend
it was fully competent for them to pass. (Emphasis added.)
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county constituted a "fresh taking";21 (3) the indictment was re-
turned by a grand jury of a county in which it was not proved that
the crime was committed; (4) the Constitution of 1820 required, in
effect, that prosecution be instituted by indictment, since it expressly
forbade beginning a prosecution by information ;26 and (5) that the
same constitution gave defendant a right to be tried by a jury of the
vicinage.27 Although neither of the constitutional provisions referred
to were mentioned by the court in its opinion, it is inconceivable that
the judges were not aware of them. Thus, those judges saw no con-
stitutional objection to a statute which permitted indictment for and
trial of an offense in a county where no part of the offense may have
been committed. Not only was this true when the locale of the crime
was uncertain and difficult of proof, but in dicta the court approved
other venue-laying statutes which were contrary to the "gist" rule.23
In State v. Grable,29 while the newer Constitution of 1865 was in
force, the court upheld a statute which provided that
Where there is a matter of doubt, in the opinion of the court,
in which of two or more counties the offense was committed, the
court of either county in which the indictment is found shall have
jurisdiction of the offense3 0
Certainly, then, the early Missouri cases show no unwillingness on
the part of the courts to permit legislative change of the gist rule,
25. See infra, text at notes 72-78, for a discussion of the common law exception
which permitted trial for larceny in any county into which the thief had trans-
ported the goods.
26. Mo. Const. art. XIII, § 14 (1820).
27. Mo. Const. art. XIII, § 9 (1820).
28. See note 24 supra.
29. 46 Mo. 350 (1870). Again the court did not refer to the putatively
applicable constitutional provisions, but, instead, said of the instruction to the
jury that "as the court was in d.ubt as to which of the counties mentioned
in the testimony the offense was committed in, the jury should proceed as though
the offense was committed in Buchanan County, where the indictment was
found," and that "there is nothing here to prejudice the rights of the defendant."
Id. at 353.
30. Mo. Gen. Stat. c. 211, § 8 (1865). In addition to the provisions with
respect to place of trial (Mo. Const. art. I, § 18 (1865)) and the forbidding
of prosecutions by information (Mo. Const. art. I, § 24 (1865)), the constitution
in force at the time also empowered the legislature to provide by law for the
indictment and trial of persons charged with felonies in a county other than
that in which the crime was committed, if an impartial grand or petit jury
could not be obtained in the latter county (Mo. Const. art. XI, § 12 (1865)).
This provision was not referred to in the case, but in later cases its existence
at the time of the Grable case was to assume all-encompassing importance.
The legislature had passed an effectuating statute which was in force at the
time of the decision in Grable. Mo. Gen. Stat. c. 212, § 42 (1865), discussed
infra, text at note 29.
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and they concede to the legislature the power necessary to provide for
cases in which the usual burden of proving venue could not be satis-
fied, or in which it was clear that no part of the crime occurred in the
county of trial.
Subsequent to Steerman and Grable, Missouri adopted a new con-
stitution, that of 1875. It contained three changes which have some
bearing on our problem. First, it provided affirmatively that all fel-
ony prosecutions should be begun by indictment, instead of negatively
by denying the power to proceed by information ;31 second, it granted
one accused of crime the right to a trial by a jury of the "county" in-
stead of a jury of the "vicinage" ;82 third, it did not contain the ex-
press provision found in the Constitution of 1865 empowering the
legislature to provide for indictment and trial in a county other than
that in which the crime was committed when an impartial grand jury
could not be had there.3
Under the power granted by that provision of the Constitution of
1865, or, at least, in conformity to it,3 the legislature had enacted the
following statute:
Whenever an offense has been committed in any county, and the
grand jury of the county has considered the matter, and failed to
find an indictment against the offender, and the same is certified
to the judge of the same circuit from the foreman of the grand
jury or the clerk of the circuit court of such county, and the judge
is satisfied that an impartial grand jury cannot be had in the
county where the offense was committed, he shall order the exam-
ination of the offense to be had in some county adjacent to the
said county, where he believes no such cause exists, but no in-
vestigation can be ordered by him, except in one county; and,
where an indictment is found in such county, a trial before a
petit jury shall be had in the county where found, unless removed
on application of the defendant.35
In Ex parte Slater,3G the grand jury of Clark County failed to return
a true bill against petitioner, who was suspected of murder committed
in Clark County. Deciding that this was due to the impossibility of
obtaining an impartial grand jury in Clark County, the circuit judge
assembled a grand jury in Scotland County, pursuant to the above
statute. That grand jury returned an indictment charging petitioner
31. Mo. Const. art. II, § 12 (1875).
32. Mo. Const. art. II, § 22 (1875).
33. Mo. Const. art. XI, § 12 (1865). See note 30 supra.
34. I have been unable to trace the precise origin of the statute cited in the
following footnote, but it was in force and appeared in the General Statutes
of 1865, although I cannot find it in the Revised Statutes of 1855.
35. Mo. Gen. Stat. c. 212, § 42 (1865).
36. 72 Mo. 102 (1880).
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with murder committed in Clark County. The petitioner was im-
prisoned under the indictment and sought habeas corpus.
In ordering his discharge, the Missouri Supreme Court held the
authorizing statute invalid37 on the following reasoning. The court
said that under article 2, section 12 and article 2, section 22 of the
Constitution of 1875, defendant was guaranteed two things pertinent
to this inquiry: (1) the right to have any felony prosecution instituted
by indictment, and (2) the right after indictment to a trial by an im-
partial jury of the county." The procedure authorized by the statute
violated the first of these rights because of the meaning given to the
word "indictment" in section 12 of article 22. This term, the court
asserted, had a well-settled meaning at common law, and, since there
was no indication on the part of the framers to depart from its com-
mon law meaning, that meaning controlled.39 Quoting extensively
from recognized texts,40 but without citing a single case, the court
stated that one of the attributes of an indictment at common law was
that it had to be returned by a grand jury of the county where the
offense was committed. 41 This statute authorized a judge to impanel
a grand jury which in turn was empowered to return an indictment
charging an offense committed in another county. If the statute and
the procedure under it were sanctioned, one could be deprived of his
constitutional right to be prosecuted for a felony only by indictment,
for the "indictment" returned by the grand jury of Scotland County
would not be an "indictment" in the constitutional sense.
The court buttressed its conclusion by pointing out that the Consti-
tution of 1865 had specifically authorized the legislature to provide for
this, arguing that the omission of a similar provision from the 1875
Constitution was clear evidence that its framers did not desire such
power to be longer vested in the legislature. 2 In addition, the court
noted that no similar provision could be found in the Constitution of
1820, and from that fact inferred that the framers of the Constitution
of 1865 felt the necessity of inserting such a provision if the legisla-
ture was to have the desired power.43 In short, the inference was that
the legislature had this power only during the period 1865 to 1875.
Again several facts are worthy of note. That no case, Missouri or
foreign, was cited by the court in its opinion means that the court did
37. Ibid.
38. Id. at 105-06.
39. Id. at 106.
40. Id. at 106-07. The texts quoted from are Bacon's Abridgement, Hawkins'
Pleas of the Crown, and Bishop's Criminal Procedure.
41. Ibid.
42. Id. at 109. See note 30 supra.
43. Ibid.
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not face, or at least did not see fit to discuss, the difficulties raised by
the earlier cases discussed above-Steermnx 4 and Grab/e.4 5 Yet those
cases were decided under constitutions which, by forbidding felony
prosecutions by information, also required them to be begun by indict-
ment. Furthermore, the Constitution of 1820, in force when Steerman
was decided, contained no provision empowering the legislature to
vary the venue in certain situations as was the case when Grable was
decided. In fact the court in Slater assumed, or at least stated that the
framers of the Constitution of 1865 assumed, that the legislature was
without such power prior to 1865. Notice should also be taken of the
fact that the court, probably because the issue arose after indictment
but prior to trial, did not base its decision on the place of trial pro-
vision, but rather on the indictment provision. It nevertheless did
invalidate the entire statute without effort to distinguish the two
facets of it.
Yet, when all this is said, one remains curious. The nominal rea-
sons seem unsatisfactory. Why does "indictment" apparently mean
something different-and, at that, something conforming more closely
to early common law principles4-in 1880 than it did in 1847 and
1870? Why were the earlier cases, which were cited by the attorney-
general,'- ignored in the opinion? Can all this be due to the fact that
some language which appeared in the Constitution of 1865-which
was apparently thought unnecessary by the Steerman court-was
deleted when the new constitution was promulgated? An affirmative
answer seems unlikely, especially in view of the fact that the reason-
ing of Slater would necessarily have led to a different result in the
earlier cases, a result the court has since reached. 48
What, then, can be offered by way of explanation? Speculation sug-
gests that the argument based on the characteristics of the common
law indictment simply had not been urged on the court in the early
cases, and that Slater is the result of a brilliant piece of advocacy by
the defense attorney. It must be granted, of course, that the person-
44. Steerman v. State, 10 Mo. 503 (1847).
45. State v. Grable, 46 Mo. 350 (1870).
46. It would appear that even if the common law rule required that all of
the facts occur in the county which returned the grand jury, long before 1607
this rule was changed in particular cases by various English statutes. Thus
33 Hen. 8, c. 23 (1541); 2 & 3 Edw. 6, c. 24 (1547) varied the common law venue
rules. Yet it cannot be seriously contended that indictments returned under
circumstances authorized by them were not common law indictments, in any
meaningful sense. 1607 is significant, of course, because Missouri's common
law is that of that year including statutes in force at the time. Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 1.010 (Vernon 1949).
47. Ex parte Slater, 72 Mo. 102, 103-04 (1880).
48. See text supported by notes 65-71 infra.
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nel of the court changed in the interim between Steerman and Slater.
Furthermore, the statutes sustained in the early cases were all aimed
at situations in which there might well be substantial doubt where the
offense was committed, although precise proof that it was committed
in a county other than that in which the indictment was returned and
trial had would not have influenced the result in Steermn. In any
event Slcter immediately became, and has remained, the landmark
case in Missouri with respect to venue in criminal cases. Shortly after
it was decided, a whole series of statutes was invalidated on the
strength of the principle it announced.
First came Petition of McDonald.4 1 Petitioner and his son allegedly
killed X in Ray County but within five hundred yards of Caldwell
County. The grand jury of Ray County returned a true bill against
the son, but not against the petitioner. While the son was in jail in
Ray County, a grand jury of Caldwell County indicted the son and
petitioner for murder, the son as a principal in the first degree, and
petitioner as a principal in the second degree. The indictment stated
explicitly that the murder was committed in Ray County, but within
five hundred yards of Caldwell County. In discharging petitioner on
habeas corpus, the court held invalid the following statute, which
purported to authorize the indictment.
When an offense shall be committed on the boundary of two
counties, or within five hundred yards of such boundary, or where
the person committing the offense shall be on one side, and the
injury be done on the other side of such boundary, an examina-
tion thereof may be made and an indictment may be found, and a
trial and conviction thereon had, in either of such counties."
The opinion uses precisely the reasoning of Slater. The court was
faced with a further contention, however, which would not have been
appropriate in Slater. It was argued that the section of the statutes
under consideration should be interpreted as providing merely a rule
of evidence, and so be held valid.' 1 In rejecting that contention the
court made two points. (1) Immediately following the section under
discussion, in the Revised Statutes of 1879, was the following section:
Where there is a matter of doubt, in the opinion of the court,
in which of two or more counties the offense was committed, the
court of either in which the indictment was found, shall havejurisdiction of the offence. 2
The court said, correctly, that the latter section was the one designed
to provide a rule of evidence in cases where the precise place of crime
49. 19 Mo. App. 370 (1885).
50. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1697 (1879).
51. 19 Mo. App. at 376.
52. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1698 (1879).
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was in doubt, and that to attribute the same purpose to the section
under consideration would be to create a superfluity.53 (2) But, even
if the instant section were to be given that meaning, it would be essen-
tial that the indictment should allege that the offense was committed
in Caldwell County, which it did not, again a correct ruling.5 4
The state also argued"5 that the reasoning invalidating the instant
section would also necessitate a later ruling that the section under
consideration in Steerman was invalid. 6 The court's answer was (a)
the question was not before it for decision,5" and (b) in any event,
common law precedent could probably be found for a different han-
dling of cases involving offenses committed on navigable waters, al-
though it was doubtful whether the same could be said of offenses
committed on railroad trains. 8 As we shall see, later events demon-
strated the accuracy of the state's prediction. 9
The following points should be noticed: the court assumed that a
statute providing merely a rule of evidence in cases of doubt would be
valid, and suggested that an allegation that the offense was committed
in a county other than that of the grand jury would always be fatal.
Yet, if the offense is alleged in the indictment to have been committed
in the grand jury's county, evidence raising a doubt about its situs
might not necessarily prove fatal.
State v. Hatch" tested the validity of the McDonald assumption that
section 1698,1 giving jurisdiction, in cases of doubt, to the county in
which the indictment was returned, was constitutional. Defendant
was the general collecting agent for a St. Louis firm which sold
mowers and reapers throughout the state. He resided in Sedalia, but
by the terms of his contract was obliged to account in St. Louis, either
in person or by mail, for collections. After making collections in sev-
eral counties in western Missouri, he represented in person to his
employers that he had made no collections, and, on the strength of
that representation, drew part of what was then due on his salary.
In fact he had appropriated the collected money by using it in grain
speculations in Sedalia. Charged in St. Louis with embezzlement of
the money appropriated in Sedalia, defendant secured a reversal of
his conviction on the ground that the crime of embezzlement was com-
53. 19 Mo. App. at 376.
54. Id. at 377.
55. Id. at 379.
56. See discussion in text supported by notes 22-28 supra, and notes 66-71
infra.
57. 19 Mo. App. at 379.
58. Ibid.
59. See text at notes 66-71 infra.
60. 91 Mo. 568, 4 S.W. 502 (1887).
61. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1698 (1879).
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mitted not in St. Louis, but in Sedalia. The court in a brief opinion
held the "in doubt" section invalid, relying on the Slater principle. 2
Again, several points must be observed. Initially, it seems clear that
this is not the kind of "doubt" contemplated by the section under con-
sideration. Here the doubt was not about where any act took place,
but whether the rule put the situs of the crime of embezzlement (1)
where the property was converted, or (2) where the duty to account
was breached. Certainly this section was never intended to resolve
doubts when prosecuting attorneys or judges were uncertain what the
Missouri Supreme Court would hold to be the gist of embezzlement,
or any other offense. Rather it was intended, and this seems obvious,
to apply in cases in which the evidence left it doubtful where the acts
constituting the course of criminal conduct occurred. The court, then,
should not have passed upon the validity of the statute at all, in spite
of the fact that it was urged upon the court by the attorney general
as an additional reason for sustaining the conviction."3
Because the attorney general urged the statute on the court as a
modification of the gist rule, which required trial in the county
where "the essence" of the offense was committed,2  it might be
argued that the court treated that rule as one of constitutional law,
which the legislature could not change. Although this is not an im-
possible interpretation of the case, I believe it to be an incorrect one.
Instead it seems that the court did not regard the statute as an at-
tempt to circumvent the gist rule but rather as one authorizing trial
in a particular county when the evidence did not show where the con-
duct occurred. Whether this interpretation of the statute is correct is
not nearly so crucial to this analysis as is the bare fact that the court
chose to treat the statute as totally unrelated to the gist rule. In-
deed, I must admit at this point that the validity of my conclusions
depends upon the correctness of my interpretation of this important
case, 64 which is, in short, that it did not convert the gist rule into
62. State v. Hatch, 91 Mo. 568, 569, 4 S.W. 502 (1887).
63. Id. at 569.
63a. See note 4 supra, and text supported thereby.
64. Similarly, it might be contended that two other cases established the "gist"
rule (see text at note 6 supra) as one of constitutional law in this state. In State
v. McGraw, 87 Mo. 161 (1885), defendant committed burglary and larceny in
Clinton County, and brought the fruits of those crimes into Jackson County. His
conviction of burglary in Jackson County was reversed, and § 1691 of the Revised
Statutes of 1879 held unconstitutional insofar as it applied to a crime like
burglary which involved no asportation element. That section was in the follow-
ing form at the time McGraw was decided:
When property stolen in one county and brought into another, shall
have been taken by larceny, burglary or robbery, the offender may be in-
dicted, tried and convicted for such larceny, burglary or robbery, in the
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one of constitutional law in Missouri, but implicitly accepted it as the
common law rule in the absence of legislative change.
Finally came the sequel to Slater, which completed the elimination
of the statutes designed to aid in the solution of cases where there was
real doubt where the acts occurred, and which also extended the rule,
previously applied only to indictments, to informations as well.6 5 De-
fendant ran a gambling table on a riverboat plying between Missouri's
north and south boundaries on the Mississippi River. The voyage
terminated at the City of St. Louis. An information charging de-
fendant with a misdemeanor was filed in the St. Louis Court of Crimi-
nal Corrections, which had jurisdiction to try misdemeanors com-
mitted in the City of St. Louis only. The information was filed under
the same statute whose validity was sustained in the first of this line
of cases, Steerman.r3 That section, it will be recalled, provided for
indictment and trial of offenses committed aboard vessels67 now ex-
tended to railroad trainss-in any county through which the vessel
or train passed on the particular trip, or where the trip terminated.
It will also be recalled that the statute was sustained easily, indeed
county into which such stolen property was brought, in the same manner
as if such larceny, burglary or robbery had been committed in that
county.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1691 (1879).
In State v. Smiley, 98 Mo. 605, 12 S.W. 247 (1889), defendant was prosecuted
for bigamy under a statute defining that offense as the entering into a second
marriage by one having a husband or wife living, and providing further that:
An indictment for bigamy . . . may be found . . . in the county in
which such.., subsequent marriage... shall have taken place, or in the
county in which the offender may be apprehended. (Emphasis added.)
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1536 (1879).
The second marriage took place in Johnson County, but the indictment was
returned by the grand jury of Madison County, where the defendant was appre-
hended but did not cohabit. The court held the procedure unconstitutional on the
ground that no part of the crime of bigamy was committed in the county whose
grand jury returned the indictment, relying on Slater.
Although detailed discussion and analysis of these two cases will be postponed
(see text at notes 134-37 and 217-20 infra), it should be made clear here that
their constitutionality could be sustained only if the court were to take the posi-
tion that under the constitutional provisions we are considering, the legislature
has power to lay venue in a county where no essential part of the crime was
committed. That the Missouri Supreme Court is unwilling to take such a position
is abundantly clear. It is also clear, however, that these two cases do not convert
the "gist" rule into one of constitutional law in Missouri, for in them, no part
of the crime was committed in the county of prosecution.
65. State v. Anderson, 191 Mo. 134, 90 S.W. 95 (1905).
66. Steerman v. State, 10 Mo. 503 (1847).
67. Mo. Rev. Stat. c. 138, art. IV, § 6 (1845).
68. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 2413 (1899).
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without discussion, in Steerman,69 and that dicta in McDonaldt sug-
gested that common law precedent could be found to sustain it.
But the prediction of counsel in McDonald came true: no longer did
the legislature have the power to provide for cases in which the situs
of the acts was in doubt. The reasoning of Slater was adopted in toto,
and, furthermore, was extended to informations on the theory that
It is clear that under the consiitutional provision a proceeding
by information cannot be of any broader scope than that by in-
dictment, and if an indictment must be returned by the grandjury of the county in which the offense was committed, it logically
follows that the information must be lodged in the county in
which the offense was committed.71
Thus the full gamut was run. From a clear recognition of legisla-
tive power to solve a difficult practical problem in administering crim-
inal justice, the court steadily retreated, and ended by putting the
problem beyond the competence of the legislature. In cases falling
within the first of the categories, those in which there is no doubt
where every part of the total course of criminal conduct occurred and
where every part occurred in a single county, the legislature is with-
out power to provide for venue in any different county. In cases fall-
ing within the second of the categories, those in which there is doubt
-perhaps not resolvable under ordinary burden of proof rules-
where some significant part of the total course of criminal conduct
occurred, the defendant simply cannot be convicted if all the proper
objections are made at the proper times.
LARCENY EXCEPTION
The great common law exception to the strict venue rules was that
one could be indicted for and convicted of larceny in any county into
which he brought the goods though he had stolen them elsewhere7 2
That exception early became a part of Missouri's statutory law as
well.7 3
69. See discussion at notes 22-28 supra.
70. Petition of McDonald, 19 Mo. App. 370 (1885). See discussion at notes
49-59 supra.
71. State v. Anderson, 191 Mo. 134, 144, 90 S.W. 95, 99 (1905).
72. 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 302 (8th ed. Curwood, 1824); Bishop,
Criminal Procedure 32 (3d ed. 1880); Starkie, Criminal Pleading 3 n.g (1st Am.
ed. 1824) ; 1 Russell, op. cit. supra, note 1 at 27.
73. At this point recognition must be given the fact that there are two different
situations which raise the problem. The first arises when the goods are stolen
outside the state and brought into the state. The first statutory reference I have
found to that situation is Mo. Rev. Stat. art. IX, § 3 (1835). In its present form,
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 541.040 (Vernon Supp. 1957) provides:
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In a series of cases upholding it, the court has, either as hold-
Every person who shall steal, or obtain by robbery, the property of
another from any other state or country, and shall bring the same into
this state, may be convicted and punished for stealing or robbery in the
same manner as if the property had been feloniously stolen or taken in
this state, and in any such case the stealing or robbery may be charged
to have been committed, and every such person may be prosecuted in any
county into or through which such stolen property shall be brought.
Whether, at common law, one could be prosecuted in England for larceny be-
cause he stole property elsewhere and brought it into the realm is doubtful. See
1 Bishop, Criminal Law §§ 136-42 (9th ed. 1923) for a full discussion of this
problem. See 1 Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors, 20, n.(e) (8th
ed., Ross & McClure 1923), for a flat statement that the common law did not
permit conviction in England in the circumstances under consideration. The
Missouri cases are interesting. In those decided prior to Slater, the court rec-
ognized a conflict in other states about the common law rule, but simply held that
the matter was settled in Missouri by the statute under consideration. State v.
Butler, 67 Mo. 59 (1877); State v. Williams and Howard, 35 Mo. 229 (1864);
Hemmaker v. State, 12 Mo. 453 (1849). The leading post-Slater case, State v.
Mintz, 189 Mo. 268, 88 S.W. 12 (1905), was decided on exactly the same reason-
ing as was utilized in the pre-Slater cases. See also, State v. Parker, 301 Mo.
294, 256 S.W. 1040 (1923). It must be pointed out that the rationale of Slater
would seem to demand resolution of the state of the common law authorities, but
that was not done in this series of cases.
On the other hand, when goods stolen in one Missouri county are transported
to another the court has always recognized the common law rule permitting trial
in either county. State v. Williams, 147 Mo. 14, 47 S.W. 891 (1898); State v.
Smith, 66 Mo. 61 (1877). In fact the earliest statute which I have been able to
locate codifying the common law rule when the original theft occurred in a dif-
ferent county but within the state is Mo. Rev. Stat. c. 211, § 19 (1865). The
earlier statute had provided that:
When property stolen in one county, and brought into another, shall have
been taken by burglary or robbery, the offender may be indicted, tried
and convicted for such burglary or robbery, in the county into which
such stolen property was brought, in the same manner as if such burglary
or robbery had been committed in that county.
Mo. Rev. Stat. art. IV, § 14 (1835).
It is significant that this statute did not cover the common law larceny situation,
presumably because the legislature regarded it as unnecessary, but did attempt
to extend the common law principle to robbery and burglary. The present statute
is Mo. Ann. Stat. § 541.070 (Supp. 1957). It provides:
When property is stolen or taken by robbery in one county and brought
into another the offender may be prosecuted for such stealing or robbery
in the county into which such stolen property was brought in the same
manner as if such stealing or robbery had been committed in that county.
It seems clear that if no constitutional obstacle exists when the theft occurs out-
side the state, none can exist when the theft occurs within the state but in a
county other than that of trial. Certainly either the "fresh asportation" or the
"continuing offense" theory would support such a conclusion.
In Mintz, supra, at 292, 88 S.W. at 20, however, the court relied in part on
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ing or in dictum, advanced four principal reasons :74 (1) the common
law recognized such an exception,75 and presumably the indictment
requirement of the constitution was drafted in the light of the whole
common law and not merely part of it; (2) larceny is, in its nature, a
continuing offense ;76 (3) each transportation into another county
constitutes a "fresh theft" because it necessitates a "fresh asporta-
tion" ;77 (4) the legislature is free to name offenses as it sees fit, and if
it wishes to place the label of larceny on the thief's act of transporting
property he has stolen into a different county, it can do so. 78
Of the first reason, it can be said that it combines a recognition of
the opinion of Cooley, J., in People v. Williams, 24 Mich. 156 (1871), and quoted
from it as follows:
" ... The present is a case of trespass upon private right begun, indeed,
in another State, but continued into our own, and which the paramount
law of the land requires that we should see righted on demand of the
party aggrieved. The persistence in the wrong here, then, as against the
right of one whom the State is bound to protect to the full extent that it
must protect one of its own citizens, is not only not a matter of indiffer-
ence to the State, but is a flagrant contempt of its authority, and it is
eminently proper that the State should treat it as a crime .... " (Em-
phasis added.)
Part of this argument would not apply to an inter-county situation, but the em-
phasized words seem superfluous in any event, and the equal protection of the
laws argument is simply fallacious.
Resting then on the assumption no court which would sustain the validity of
a statute authorizing trial within the state, where the larceny occurred outside
it, would invalidate a statute permitting trial in any county into which the goods
were taken when they were stolen in a different county within the state, the cases
involving construction of both statutes will be cited indiscriminately in the fol-
lowing notes.
74. In the following cases, the court seems to be saying that the mere fact
that the legislature has passed the statute is conclusive. State v. Parker, 301 Mo.
294, 256 S.W. 1040 (1923) ; State v. Jackson, 86 Mo. 18 (1885) ; State v. Ware,
62 Mo. 597 (1876); State v. Harney, 54 Mo. 141 (1873); State v. Williams &
Howard, 35 Mo. 229 (1864); State v. Abney, 311 Mo. 700, 702, 278 S.W. 724
(1925) (dictum).
75. State v. Williams, 147 Mo. 14, 47 S.W. 891 (1898); State v. Butler, 67 Mo.
59 (1877); State v. Smith, 66 Mo. 61 (1877).
76. State v. Mintz, 189 Mo. 268, 292, 88 S.W. 12, 20 (1905) (dictum); Ex parte
Slater, 72 Mo. 102, 109 (1880) (dictum).
77. State v. Crow, 337 Mo. 397, 402, 84 S.W.2d 926, 929 (1935) ; State v. Wil-
liams, 147 Mo. 14, 19, 47 S.W. 891 (1898) ; State v. Smith, 66 Mo. 61, 63 (1877) ;
State v. Hatch, 91 Mo. 568, 570, 4 S.W. 502 (1887) (dictum); State v. McGraw,
87 Mo. 161, 163 (1885) (dictum); Ex parte Slater, 72 Mo. 102, 109 (1880)
(dictum). Considerable doubt is cast on the present validity of this rationale
in Missouri by State v. Bockman, 344 Mo. 80, 124 S.W.2d 1205 (1939). See the
discussion in text at notes 84-89 infra.
78. State v. Crow, supra note 77 (semble); State v. Mintz, 189 Mo. 268, 88
S.W. 12 (1905) ; State v. Butler, 67 Mo. 59 (1877) ; Hemmaker v. State, 12 Mo.
453 (1849). Similarly, considerable doubt is also cast on the soundness of this
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the facts of legal history79 with a legitimate inference about the in-
tention of the constitution-makers. In short, if Slater is sound, so is
it sound to engraft the common law exception to its rationale, nothing
to the contrary appearing. The second and third reasons are fictions.
The offense of larceny is complete at a single point in time: it does not
continue. Furthermore, a thief is, by definition, one who gets posses-
sion, and the basic theory of larceny is a taking from possession.80
Any suggestions' that one may trespass on his own possession is an
obvious fiction, which can be justified only because it supports a re-
sult. If it is desirable to reach that result, however, a frank statement
of the reasons would always be more satisfactory.
The fourth reason is a makeshift because it does not fit with any
reasonable view of legislative intention. The theory behind it is, of
course, that the offense is actually "transporting into another county
goods which the thief has previously stolen" and that calling that
crime "larceny" or "shiskabob" is entirely within the legislative
prerogative. Indeed, if it were the legislative intention to make a
separate crime out of re-asporting goods, already once asported as
part of the original larceny, the fact that the second asportation is
over a geographical boundary line would seem entirely unrelated to
that purpose.
But we need not confine ourselves to speculation and theorizing.
Section 541.050 of the Missouri statutes, a provision going back in
substance to 1835,s2 provides as follows:
Every person prosecuted under section 541.040 may plead a
former conviction or acquittal for the same offense in another
state or county, and if such plea be admitted or established, it
shall be a bar to any other or further proceedings against such
person.8 3
This section, of course, only applies to prior convictions or acquittals
outside the state; it does not cover cases in which the prior conviction
or acquittal is in a different Missouri county, and there is no analo-
gous section in the Missouri statutes covering the latter situation.
However, in 1939 the Missouri Supreme Court was faced with the
necessity for ruling on that precise issue.8 4 Defendants apparently
stole several articles from the same person at the same time, the theft
rationale by State v. Bockman, supra note 77, discussed in text at notes 84-89
infra.
79. 1 Russell, op. cit. supra note 1.
80. See, e.g., the discussion in Perkins, Criminal Law 202-03 (1957).
81. See the elaborate rationale worked out in justification of this reasoning in
1 Bishop, op. cit. supra note 72; and in 1 Bishop, op. cit. supra note 73, at §§
136-42. This is not to deny that the same conclusion, but without the same elab-
orateness of rationale, can be found in most other treatises as well.
82. Mo. Rev. Stat. 212, § 4 (1835).
83. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 541.050 (Vernon 1949).
84. State v. Bockman, 344 Mo. 80, 124 S.W.2d 1205 (1939).
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taking place in Carter County. Charged with, tried for, and convicted
of taking some, but not all, of the articles in Carter County, defen-
dants appealed from the judgment of conviction. While that appeal
was pending, defendants were prosecuted in Oregon County for lar-
ceny of part of the property which they had carried into Oregon
County. Defendants' plea of former conviction was overruled at the
trial, and they were convicted. While their appeal from the second
conviction was pending, the supreme court dismissed their appeal
from the first conviction. They thus stood convicted, with no further
right to appeal, of larceny in Carter County, when the court was called
upon to decide the appeal from the second conviction.
In reversing the second conviction, the court held that stealing
several articles from the same person at the same time constituted but
one offense under Missouri law, a point which had been conceded by
the state.8 5 Taking judicial notice of its action in dismissing the ap-
peal from the first conviction,8 the court went on to rule that defen-
dants had
sufficiently invoked the protection of their rights under that
maxim of the common law, approved by varying Federal and
state constitutional and statutory provisions, that no man shall
be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb (or convicted) for the
same offense.8 7
Finally the court, apparently in answer to a contention that the origi-
nal larceny was one offense and the transporting across a county
boundary a distinct offense so that no double jeopardy or related
problem arose, made the following statement, which bears directly on
our problem:
We are not unmindful of the statements in State v. Smith,
.. and State v. Williams, ... that ".... each transportation of
stolen property from one county to another is a fresh theft." Sec-
tion... [541.070] ... is a venue statute and is clearly so treated
in State v. Crow .... The issue in the Smith and Williams cases
involved venue, not substantive law.", (Emphasis added.)
It is tenable to argue when the theft occurs outside the state and the
goods are brought into the state, that there are two disinct offenses, a
concept which would give rise to no jeopardy problem. This view is
supported by the fact that the Missouri legislature felt it necessary
specifically to prevent a conviction for bringing stolen goods into this
state whenever the defendant had been convicted or acquitted of the
original (other?) crime in the foreign state.8 9 But even if that con-
85. Id. at 81, 124 S.W.2d at 1206.
86. Id. at 83, 124 S.W.2d at 1206.
87. Id. at 82, 124 S.W.2d at 1206.
88. Id. at 82, 124 S.W.2d at 1206.
89. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 541.050 (Vernon 1949).
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clusion be correct, it is clear that under the case, transporting prop-
erty stolen in County A into County B by the original thief is not a
separate substantive offense. It might be added here that this ruling
seems unquestionably correct. More significantly, that would seem to
leave only the arguments that the common law permitted conviction
in County B and that larceny is a "continuing offense" to support the
validity of the larceny exception to Slater.
Despite the fact that this exception is firmly established as a part
of Missouri statutory law that has been upheld repeatedly against
constitutional attacks, the reasons advanced in support of the excep-
tion need further consideration. This is because those reasons may
aid or hinder efforts, whether made by prosecutors or the legislature,
to provide alternative places of trial by analogy to the larceny excep-
tion. Thus, a study of the fate of efforts to accomplish this end is
next indicated.
THE FATE OF ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE FOR VENUE
In addition to attempts by prosecutors to convince the court to per-
mit alternative places of trial in certain situations, seven principal
statutory efforts have been directed to this purpose. Some of these
efforts have been bottomed on assumed analogies to the larceny situa-
tion; others have proceeded without explicit reference to it. Six of the
statutory efforts have an ancient lineage, the other is very recent.
The six provide places of trial for the crimes of homicide,90 burgary,91
kidnapping, 2 bigamy, 93 receiving,94 and for accessoryship :95 the sev-
90. See the statutes cited in notes 97-101 infra.
91. Mo. Rev. Stat. 483, § 14 (1835), provided that:
When property stolen in one county, and brought into another, shall
have been taken by burglary or robbery, the offender may be indicted,
tried and convicted for such burglary or robbery, in the county into
which such stolen property was brought, in the same manner as if such
burglary or robbery had been committed in that county. (Emphasis
added.)
As is indicated in text supported by notes 217-24 infra, the attempt to apply this
rule to burglary prosecutions resulted in a decision that that part of the statute
was unconstitutional in State v. McGraw, 87 Mo. 161 (1885). It is interesting
to note that apparently no attempt was ever made to extend the principle to
burglaries committed outside the state. The original section applied only to
larceny and robbery (Mo. Rev. Stat. 212, § 3 (1835)) and the present section is
similarly limited. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 541.040 (Vernon Supp. 1957).
92. Mo. Rev. Stat. 172, § 39 (1835), after defining two forms of kidnapping
in §§ 37 and 38, provided as follows:
Every offence prohibited in either of the two last sections, may be tried
in the county in which the crime may have been committed, or in any
county through which the person so seized . . . shall have been taken,
carried or brought.
The present substantive sections defining kidnapping and kidnapping for ransom
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enth is a more comprehensive effort to provide for crimes of appropri-
ation in addition to larceny.98
Homicide
The relevant legislation for homicide begins with a statute of 1808
containing the following provision:
If at any time a party receiving a wound or other injury in
are Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 559.230 (1) and 559.240 (1) (Vernon 1949). Subsections 2
of each of those sections are, with minor differences, in the following language:
Any person charged with such offense may be tried in any county into
or through which the person so seized,.., shall have been taken, carried
or brought.
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 559.240 (2) (Vernon 1949). See discussion in text at notes 138-
45 infra.
93. Mo. Rev. Stat. 206, § 4 (1835) provided:
An indictment for bigamy . . . may be found, and proceedings, trial,
conviction, judgment and execution thereon had, in the county in which
such second or subsequent marriage, or the cohabitation, shall have taken
place, or in the county in which the offender may be apprehended. (Em-
phasis added).
The last phrase did not appear in the Revised Statutes of 1889 and later revisions,
because of the effect of the decisions in a line of cases culminating in State v.
Smiley, 98 Mo. 605, 12 S.W. 247 (1889), discussed in text at notes 134-37 infra.
94. The original statute seems to appear first in Mo. Rev. Stat. c. 138, art.
IV, § 5 (1845). Apart from changes in form it remains part of our statute law,
appearing as Mo. Ann. Stat. § 541.060 (Vernon 1949). See discussion in text at
notes 158-74 infra.
95. The earliest statute is Mo. Rev. Stat. 319, § 18 (1825). It provided:
Where any crime or indictable offence, shall be committed and done in
one county, and other person or persons shall be accessary in any man-
ner, to any such crime or offence, in any other county; then an indict-
ment found and taken against such accessary or accessaries, in the
county where the offence of accessary shall be committed or done, shall
be as good and effectual in law, as if the principal offence had been com-
mitted or done within the same county, or the accessary or accessaries
may be proceeded against in the county where the principal offence was
committed.
From 1835 (Mo. Rev. Stat. 483, § 12 (1835)) to the present, the statute has not
contained language expressly authorizing trial in the county where the principal
crime was committed. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 541.110 (Vernon 1949). The problem
is discussed in the text at notes 150-57 infra.
96. Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 541.040 and 541.070 (Vernon Supp. 1957). See also Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 541.035 (Vernon Supp. 1957), which provides:
Offenses for failure or refusal to comply with any law requiring a
report to be filed or made in or to the state of Missouri, or any depart-
ment or officer thereof, shall be held to be committed in the county of the
residence of the person failing or refusing to file or make such report,
except where the person shall reside without the state of Missouri, in
which event the unlawful act is deemed to have been committed in the
county wherein the report is required by law to be filed.
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one district, shall die of the same wound or injury in another
district, it shall be lawful to prosecute the offender in either of
these districts.9 7
By 1825, this section was expanded to include the following:
and if at any time, a party receiving a wound or other injury
within this state, shall die of the same, without the jurisdiction
of this state, it shall be lawful to prosecute the offender or offend-
ers, both principals and accessaries, in the county within this
state where the wound or injury may have been inflicted98
By 1835, the Revised Statutes also contained the following section:
If any such wound or mortal injury shall have been inflicted in
another state, on any human being, who shall die thereof within
the state, an indictment may be found, and a trial and conviction
thereon had, in any county in which the death happened....39
The present versions of these statutes combine in three sections 00 the
following rules: (1) If death occurred within the state, the prosecution
may be in that county of the state where the death occurred, whether
the mortal wound was inflicted in the same county, a different county
in the state, or even outside the state; (2) If the mortal wound was in-
flicted within the state, trial may be had in the county where the
wound was inflicted, whether death occurred in the same county, a dif-
ferent county in the state, or even outside the state. This has been
the Missouri statutory law since at least 1835.01 The problem posed
for our consideration is whether any part of those statutes fails to
meet the test of constitutionality in Missouri under the principles
developed in Slater and the cases following it.
Some examination must be made of the common law rules. When
the mortal wound and the death both occurred within the state, but
in different counties, the common law was unsettled. It has been
contended that at common law venue was in the county where the
mortal wound was inflicted, 10 2 although it has also been stated that no
97. 1 Mo. Terr. Laws 217, § 34 (1808). In 1808, the Territory of Missouri
was a subdivision of the Territory of Louisiana.
98. Mo. Rev. Stat. 318, § 17 (1825).
99. Mo. Rev. Stat. 483, § 11 (1835).
100. Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 541.080-.100 (Vernon 1949).
101. See notes 97-100 supra.
102. There is an elaborate defense of this as the common law position in 1
Bishop, Criminal Law § 115 n.25 (9th ed., Zane and Zollman 1923). The follow-
ing statement appears in 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown *426 (1st Am. ed. 1847):
At common law, if a man had been stricken in one county and died
in another, it was doubtful whether he were indictable or triable in
either, but the more common opinion was, that he might be indicted where
the stroke was given, for the death is but a consequent, and might be
found tho in another county, ... and if the party died in another county,
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prosecution by indictment was possible if the two events occurred in
different counties. 103 It is clear that, for the purpose of resolving
the doubt, Parliament in 1547 provided by statute that when the
mortal stroke was given in one county in England, but death occurred
in a different county, the indictment must be returned by a grand
jury of the county in which the death occurred. 104
In view of the fact that Missouri common law includes those
English statutes in force in 1607,10 it seems clear that the statute
referred to should be considered part of our common law. There was,
however, no similar statute in force in 1607 for cases in which the
mortal wound was inflicted outside the realm, and death occurred
within it. Apparently, then, the English common law we inherited,
including the appropriate statutes, was that in the absence of statute
there could be no prosecution by indictment for homicide unless both
the death and the mortal wound were inflicted in the same county,
except in-so-far as 2 and 3 Edward 6, chapter 24, provided for trial in
the county of death if the mortal wound was inflicted in a different
county.
The Missouri cases, however, tell a different story. In the first of
them making reference to the problem, State v. Blunt,100 defendant
shot one Majors on a train while the train was in Newton County.
The death occurred in Lawrence County. In affirming the conviction
in Newton County, the court characterized the death as "a mere
incident and result of a crime previously consummated in another
county."'01 The court cited what is now section 541.080 of the Missouri
statutes,10 8 authorizing trial in either county under the circumstances,
and stated, curiously enough, that the section merely codified the
rule found in 2 and 3 Edward 6,109 which is the common law in
Missouri." 0
Furthermore, the court went on to say that:
Hence, in this case, there can be no doubt as to the indictment
the body was removed into the county, where the stroke was given, for
the coroner to take an inquest super visum corporis....
See also, 1 East, Pleas of the Crown 361 (1803).
103. Starkie, Criminal Pleading 3 (1st Am. ed. 1824); 2 Hawkins, Pleas of
the Crown 301-02 (8th ed., Curwood 1824).
104. 2 & 3 Edw. 6, c. 24 (1547). The preamble to the statute states, as an
assumption, that in the circumstances under consideration, an indictment could
be returned at common law by a grand jury of neither county.
105. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 1.010 (Vernon 1949).
106. 110 Mo. 322, 19 S.W. 650 (1892).
107. Id. at 337, 19 S.W. at 654.
108. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 541.080 (Vernon 1949).
109. 2 & 3 Edw. 6, c. 24 (1547).
110. 110 Mo. 322, 338, 19 S.W. 650, 654 (1892).
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having been found in the proper county, the county where the
offense was committed, the blow given, and the circuit court of
that county had, therefore, jurisdiction, and the indictment is,
therefore, not obnoxious to the objection now being discussed.
Under this view we forbear discussing the question, because
not presented by the record, whether an indictment would be
jurisdictionally and constitutionally valid if found in the county
of the death., (Emphasis added.)
In every subsequent case except State v. May,"1 2 the trial has been
held in the county where the mortal wound was inflicted, and it has
been assumed 13 or held 14 immaterial that death occurred in a
different county or even outside the state. In fact, the validity of
the provision authorizing trial in the county where the mortal wound
was inflicted seems not to have been discussed. On the other hand,
one curious statement in a case reversed on other grounds makes
it doubtful whether trial may constitutionally be had in the county
of death."
111. Id. at 338, 19 S.W. at 654.
112. 142 Mo. 135, 43 S.W. 637 (1897).
113. State v. Medlin, 355 Mo. 564, 197 S.W.2d 626 (1946); State v. Conway,
351 Mo. 126, 171 S.W.2d 677 (1943) ; State v. Majors, 329 Mo. 148, 44 S.W.2d 163
(1931); State v. Garrison, 147 Mo. 548, 49 S.W. 508 (1898).
In State v. Borders, 199 S.W. 180 (Mo. 1917), the indictment in a murder
prosecution failed to contain an allegation of the place of death. Defendant
contended that the omission rendered the indictment fatally defective in that it
deprived him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation. In rejecting this contention, the court conceded that the
statute of jeofails did not change the rule that the indictment must allege every
substantive fact necessary to be proved to establish the offense, but held that the
place of death is not such a substantive fact. The court said:
Regardless of the rule at the common law or in other jurisdictions as
to the materiality of the averment in question on the ground that it
should appear that the death occurred within the realm or within the
county where the charge was laid, no such reason exists for its aver-
ment here, and it not only has not been so held, but, so far as we have
been able to determine from the reported cases, it has not been seriously
singly urged as of such materiality that the omission of same would
render an indictment violative of the Constitution.
Id. at 182.
114. State v. Batson, 339 Mo. 298, 96 S.W.2d 384 (1936).
115. In State v. May, 142 Mo. 135, 43 S.W. 637 (1897), a conviction of murder
was reversed for various errors. Although the headnote digests the case as say-
ing that the state must prove that the mortal wound, rather than the death,
occurred in the county of trial, the only statement in the opinion is curiously
uninformative. The following statement, without more, appears in the opinion:
"The State proved in what county Win. I. Burdette died, but not in what Eounty
the mortal wound occurred." Id. at 151, 43 S.W. at 641.
The inference drawn by the reporter is neither plainly true nor plainly false.
Because of the other errors the court was not obliged to decide the precise point.
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The following observations are pertinent. If 2 and 3 Edward 6 is
indeed the common law in Missouri, as the court held in Blunt, the
only proper place of trial is the county where the death occurred,
and then only when the mortal wound was inflicted within the state.
Yet the court misread 2 and 3 Edward 6 as authorizing trial in the
county where the mortal wound was inflicted, and, in addition, cast
doubt whether trial might be had in the county where the death
occurred. Then the court, without detailed consideration of the
problem, applied the same rule to cases in which the death occurred
outside the state from a wound inflicted within the state.110 It is also
important to notice that the statements in Blunt and May pertaining
to the validity of the statute authorizing trial where the death oc-
curred are dicta. As a matter of fact, only one Missouri appellate
decision has been found in which the prosecution may have occurred
in the county of death, and that case was reversed on other grounds.11 T
The homicide cases, then, provide no basis for assuming that the
court would countenance alternate places of trial except as the
common law permitted. Although the court's interpretation of the
common law and particularly of the pertinent received statute
seems erroneous, two things can be said of it: (1) the interpretation
of the common law is not unusual, 18 and (2) having made that
I believe, however, that the trial probably was held in the county of death, and
that the court saw the resulting problem, but did not have to decide it.
116. State v. Medlin, 355 Mo. 564, 197 S.W.2d 626 (1946); State v. Majors,
329 Mo. 148, 44 S.W.2d 163 (1931); State v. Garrison, 147 Mo. 548, 49 S.W.
508 (1898).
117. See State v. May, 142 Mo. 135, 43 S.W. 637 (1897), discussed in note
115 supra.
118. In point of fact, most of the American cases have so stated the common
law. See, for an excellent discussion, Riley v. State, 28 Tenn. *646 (1849),
where, in discussing the effect of Tenn. Laws 1809, c. 126, § 1, which provided
simply that the trial of criminal cases shall be in the county where the crime
was committed, and of Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 9 (1834), to the same effect, the
court said:
It is insisted by the counsel for the prisoner that the act of 1809 does
not repeal the statute (2 & 3 Edw. VI.), but is only declaratory of the
law as enacted by that statute. We think this construction erroneous.
For although at common law it was said the offense was not complete
until the death, yet it would be doing violence to language to say that
the offense was committed in the county where the death happened, al-
though the stroke were given in another county. Therefore, when the
act of 1809 prescribes that the trial shall be had in the county where
the offense was committed, the intention of the legislature was not to
declare the law as enacted in 2 & 3 Edw. VI, c. 24, but to alter the law,
and establish a different rule. But it is insisted that this construction
only restores the common-law rule, and involves the subject before us
in all the uncertainty that existed before the statute of Edw. VI; and,
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interpretation so long ago, it is unlikely that the court would retreat
from it. On the other hand, it is also unlikely that the court would
hold invalid section 541.08019 authorizing trial in the place of death
when the wound is inflicted within the state,10 for that result is
clearly justified under a proper reading of 2 and 3 Edward 6. The
same conclusion with respect to section 541.100,121 authorizing con-
viction in Missouri if death occurs within the state from a mortal
wound inflicted outside it, is not nearly so inevitable.12 2 It is of
particular interest that homicide has never been characterized as a
continuing crime in any of the cases under consideration. As we
shall see at a later point in this article, it is arguable that such a
characterization could be applied to it.123
as a consequence, if the stroke be given in one county and the death
happen in another, the party can be indicted in neither. We do not think
these consequences follow. In the first place, the statute of Edw. VI.
was enacted to remove all doubt upon the subject, because different
opinions, growing out of the refinements of that period of the common
law, had been expressed. We find no decision in which it had been held
that the murderer in such case could be indicted in neither county. On
the contrary, East says the common opinion was that he might be in-
dicted where the stroke was given. That alone is the act of the party.
He commits this act, and the death is only a consequence. Therefore,
when the legislature enacted that the party shall be tried in the county
where the offense may have been committed, they intended where the
active agency of the perpetrator was employed. And this law is only
in accordance with the Constitution, which declares that he shall have
"a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the crime shall have been committed." Art. 1, sec. 9. These pro-
visions of the Constitution, and of the act of 1809, were intended to
secure the right of trial with certainty, in the neighborhood of the wit-
nesses, so that they might be easily procured, and thus secure the de-
fendant a fair trial.
Id. at *657-58.
It is significant that the Tennessee constitutional provision and statute are
nearly identical with Missouri's provisions. See Mo. Const. art. I, § 18(a); Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 541.030 (Vernon 1949). It is also significant that the Tennessee
Supreme Court has given full scope to the constitutional provision as has Mis-
souri. Compare Armstrong v. State, 41 Tenn. *337 (1860), with Petition of Mc-
Donald, 19 Mo. App. 370 (1885).
119. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 541.080 (Vernon 1949).
120. But see the reasoning of the Tennessee court in Riley v. State, 28 Tenn.
*646 (1849), discussed in note 118 supra.
121. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 541.100 (Vernon 1949).
122. The leading cases upholding such convictions are Commonwealth v.
Macloon, 101 Mass. 1 (1869) and Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320 (1860).
123. See "Summary and Recommendations" infra.
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Bigamy
Although bigamy was originally only a canonical offense," 4 it was
made a statutory felony in 1604.125 The substantive statute also
contained the following provision relating to venue:
[A]nd the party . . . so offending shall receive such and the
like proceeding, trial and execution in such county where such
person . . . shall be apprehended, as if the offence had been
committed in such county where such person.., shall be taken
or apprehended. 126
Because this statute was in force in 1607, it would appear to be part
of Missouri's received common law. But again, an examination of
the cases leads to a different conclusion.
Some background of Missouri's substantive bigamy law is essential.
At least since 1835,127 the crime denominated "bigamy" by the legisla-
ture can be committed in the following ways: (1) by a married
person marrying a second time,128 (2) by a married person marrying
a second time outside the state, and cohabiting within the state with
the person with whom he went through the second marriage cere-
mony,'129 (3) by an unmarried person knowingly marrying a married
person under circumstances where the married person would be
guilty.130 Also beginning in 1835, the following statute was in force
in Missouri until the italicized phrase was declared unconstitutional
in 1889:
An indictment for bigamy, ... may be found and proceedings,
trial, conviction, judgment and execution thereon had, in the
county in which such second or subsequent marriage, or the
cohabitation, shall have taken place, or in the county in which
the offender may be apprehended.131 (Emphasis added.)
In State v. Griswold,"' the first of three cases, defendant, while his
first wife was alive, remarried in Wisconsin and cohabited with
124. 2 Archbold, Criminal Practice and Pleading 1807 (8th ed., Pomeroy 1880).
125. 1 James 1, c. 11 (1604).
126. 1 James 1, c. 11, § 1 (1604). See 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown *694 (1st
Am. ed. 1847), for a statement that indictment and trial could be had either where
the subsequent marriage occurred or where the offender was apprehended.
127. Apparently only the previously married person could be guilty prior to
1835, since there seems to be no section comparable to that cited in note 130,
infra, in the Revised Statutes of 1825.
128. Mo. Rev. Stat. 205, art. VIII, § 1 (1835). The present statute is Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 563.170 (Vernon 1949).
129. Mo. Rev. Stat. 206, art. VIII, § 3 (1835). The present statute is Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 563.190 (Vernon 1949). The constitutionality of this section was es-
tablished in State v. Stewart, 194 Mo. 345, 92 S.W. 878 (1906).
130. Mo. Rev. Stat. 206, art. VIII, § 5 (1835). The present statute is Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 563.210 (Vernon 1949).
131. Mo. Rev. Stat. 206, art. VIII, § 4 (1835).
132. 53 Mo. 181 (1873).
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his new wife in Laclede County, Missouri. An indictment charging
bigamy was returned by the grand jury of Greene County, where
defendant was later taken into custody. In reversing the conviction,
the supreme court did not question the validity of the statute
authorizing indictment and trial in the county of apprehension, but
insisted that at common law the apprehension had to precede the
indictment in order to give jurisdiction to the court of the county
in which the apprehension occurred.
In State v. Fitzgerald,'" defendant, a single woman, was charged
with bigamy as a result of her marriage to a married man in Maries
County and her cohabitation with him in Gasconade County where
the indictment was returned and trial had. In reversing this convic-
tion the court made the following points: (1) cohabitation within
the state does not charge a crime unless the second marriage occurs
outside the state, and since that was not true here, venue could not
be sustained on the ground that it was laid where the cohabitation
took place; (2) nor could venue in Gasconade County be upheld on
the ground that defendant was apprehended there, because apprehen-
sion was not alleged to have occurred prior to indictment. With
respect to the latter point, the court relied, of course, on Griswold.
The court stated that a conviction under such circumstances con-
flicted with the Slater principle, but it is important to note that the
conclusion rested on the fact that indictment and apprehension
occurred in the wrong order, and not on any assumption that one
could never be tried for bigamy in the county of apprehension.
Finally, however, the part of the statute authorizing trial in the
county of apprehension met the fate of so many other venue statutes
of that era. In State v. Smiley, 1 defendant, a married man, married
a woman in Johnson County. Prior to the return of the indictment
in Madison County, he was apprehended there. In reversing his
conviction, the court pointed out that cohabitation is not an element
of the crime of bigamy except when the bigamous marriage occurs
outside the state. Therefore, venue could be laid only in the county
where the bigamous marriage ceremony occurred, unless the statute
authorizing indictment and trial in the county where the offender
was apprehended could be sustained. Relying on Slater and its prog-
eny, the court then invalidated the venue-laying part of the statute
because (a) "this clause has nothing to do with the elements of the
offense,"' 1 5 and (b) the larceny exception is not applicable. 136
133. 75 Mo. 571 (1882).
134. 98 Mo. 605, 12 S.W. 247 (1889).
135. Id. at 607, 12 S.W. at 247.
136. Id. at 608, 12 S.W. at 247. It should be noted that if any crime could
logically be regarded as "continuing in nature," it is the crime of cohabitation
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What is most significant here is not what the court held, but what
it did not hold. The court did not say that the legislature was power-
less to provide for trial in the county where cohabitation occurred
even when the bigamous marriage occurred in a different county in
the state; instead, it held that the legislature had not so provided.
The court subsequently upheld the statute making cohabitation an
offense when the second marriage occurred outside the state, and,
in so doing, necessarily held that the county where the cohabitation
occurred was the proper county of trial; if, therefore, the legislature
were to make cohabitation between two persons, at least one of
whom was also guilty of bigamy-either in Missouri or outside it-
a crime, it seems unlikely that the court would invalidate either the
substantive statute or a provision of it authorizing trial in the county
where the cohabitation occurred.
It is also important to observe that the Smiley case, at least by
inference, states a minimum requirement for venue-laying statutes:
some element of the offense must occur in the county of indictment
and trial. It is not enough, then, that the common law permitted
trial in a particular county. A departure from Slater can only be
justified on the ground that it provided for trial in a county in which
some constituent element of the offense occurred. This rationale will
be developed in detail at a later point in the article.137
Kidnapping
Another legislative effort to provide multiple venue appears in
Missouri's substantive kidnapping statutes. In essence those statutes
provide that kidnapping may be committed (1) by a false imprison-
ment aggravated by the additional fact that (a) the kidnapper
actually took the victim outside the boundaries of the state by force,
or (b) intended (i) to take him outside the state, or (ii) to confine
him secretly within it;'138 or (2) by an attempted or consummated
false imprisonment, aggravated by secret confinement, for the pur-
pose of collecting a reward or ransom.13 9
within the state by one who marries bigamously outside the state, or, if the
legislature should so designate it, cohabitation by anyone bigamously married.
137. See "Summary and Recommendations" infra.
138. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 559.240 (1) (Vernon 1949) :
If any person shall, wilfully and without lawful authority, forcibly
seize, confine, inveigle, decoy or kidnap any person, with intent to cause
such person to be sent or taken out of this state, or to be secretly con-
fined within the same against his will, he shall, upon conviction, be
punished ....
139. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 559.230 (1) (Vernon 1949):
If any person or persons shall wilfully, without lawful authority,
seize, confine, inveigle, decoy, kidnap or abduct or take or carry away by
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Each of the Missouri statutes contains a second section, in sub-
stantially identical language:
Any person charged with such offense may be tried in any
county through which the person so seized, ... shall have been
taken, carried or brought.14 0
In so far as I am able to discover, the language has never been con-
strued by a Missouri appellate court. 4 ' I have likewise been un-
successful in finding any direct English common law authority.
14 2
any means whatever, or attempt so to do, any child of any age, or any
person or persons and attempt or cause such child or person or persons
to be secretly confined against their will, or abducted for the purpose
and with the intention of causing the father or mother or any other rel-
ative of the person so abducted or anyone else, to pay or offer to pay
any sum as ransom or reward for the return or release of any such
child or person or persons, said person or persons so guilty . . . shall
* * * be punished ....
140. The quoted language is Mo. Ann. Stat. § 559.240(2) (Vernon 1949). Sec-
tion 559.230(2) is almost identical.
141. The only case I have found which is concerned at all with the locality of
the crime in a kidnapping case is State v. McGee, 336 Mo. 1082, 83 S.W.2d 98
(1935). There, however, the abduction occurred in the county where the trial
was had, although the victim was taken outside the state and held for ransom
there. The prosecution was under what is presently § 559.230 of the statutes.
Referring to that section, the court said that it
... insofar as here material denounces the taking or carrying away of
any person and (a) the causing of such person to be secretly confined
against his or her will, or (b) the causing of such person to be abducted
for the purpose and with the intent of causing the father or such person
to pay any sum as ransom for the return or release of such person. The
gist of the taking or carrying away is unrestricted as to place. The evi-
dence established a taking or carrying away in Jackson County, Mis-
souri, for the purpose of causing the father to pay a ransom for the
release of his daughter.
Id. at 1102, 83 S.W.2d at 110. No mention was made of the venue-laying section
of the statute, probably because it was inapplicable. Jackson County adjoins
Kansas, and it is unlikely that more than one Missouri county was involved.
142. 10 Halsbury's Laws of England 329 (3d ed., Simonds 1955) states that
the related offense of abduction is committed "not only in the county in which
the woman or girl is originally taken, but also in any county into which she is
carried by force." The authority cited is R. v. Gordon, discussed in 1 Russell,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 934, and Fullwood's Case, Cro. Car. 482, 484, 488, 493,
79 Eng. Rep. 1017, 1019, 1021, 1026 (1625). The latter case held that if the
defendant forcibly takes a woman, in violation of 3 Hen. 7, c. 2 (1487), in one
county, and marries or defiles her in another, an indictment may properly be
found in the second county, provided the force continued in the second county.
Whether the defendant can also be tried in the first county depends on whether
the marriage or defilement is an essential part of the offense. On the latter
point the judges were not in agreement. Russell states that the rule of Full-
wood's Case was recognized in the Gordon case in an instruction by Lawrence,
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It is arguable that the rule of the statute was the common law rule
in 1607.143 It is, moreover, accurate to describe kidnapping as a
continuing offense,144 and if the court meant its characterization of
larceny as a continuing offense145 to have importance as a criterion
for determining the validity of multiple venue statutes generally,
it seems likely that the court would sustain the venue-laying provi-
sions of the kidnapping statutes.
Accessoryship
The second major purpose and consequence of the Statute of 2 and 3
Edward 6,146 already discussed in another connection,'14 was to pro-
vide for venue for the trial of accessories. Its preamble deplored the
technical rules which insulated an accessory from trial in either
of two counties, when the acts of accessoryship occurred in one and
the principal offense in another. It provided, in such cases, for trial
of the accessories in the county in which the acts of accessoryship
Jr., to acquit the prisoners because the evidence failed to disclose an absence of
consent in the second county.
But see, Bruton v. Morris, Hob. 182, 80 Eng. Rep. 328 (1646) where a ques-
tion was raised in dictum:
Quaere, if the taking, and the lands, and the marrying or deflowering,
were in several counties; for it is felony composed of all those things,
as murder is of the stroke and death.
Id. at 183, 80 Eng. Rep. at 330.
Except for the doubt suggested by the last quoted material, there seems to be
substance to the view that so long as force is used in both counties, as would
invariably be the case in kidnapping, the common law rule would permit the
indictment to be found in either county.
In the leading American case, State v. Whaley, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 538 (1837),
an accessory gave aid to his principals in abducting a person; this aid was given
entirely within the county of abduction. The principals subsequently carried the
victim into another county. The accessory was indicted in the second county and
discharged on the ground of improper venue. He was then indicted in the county
of abduction, and the court affirmed his conviction. In its opinion the court, in
dicta, said that the discharge of the accessory in the second county was not an
authority that the principals could not have been tried there. As there had been
an asportavit in both counties, it said, it was clear that the principals could not
have been tried iii the second county if they could not have been tried in the
first, stating that more of the corpus delicti was proved in the first county than
in the second.
See also I East, Pleas of the Crown 453 (1803), who states the English com-
mon law as I have stated Fullwood's Case, supra.
143. See note 142 supra.
144. 2 Bishop, Criminal Law 573 (9th ed., Zane & Zollman 1923).
145. See text at note 76 supra.
146. 2 & 3 Edw. 6, c. 24 (1547).
147. See text at note 105 supra.
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took place.148 Since that statute has been declared to be part of our
received law, '4 trial of an accessory can constitutionally be had in
the county where the acts of accessoryship take place and, under
Slater, in none other. The controlling Missouri statute has been
almost a carbon copy of 2 and 3 Edward 6 since at least 1835.50 No
cases have been found construing it.
It must be pointed out, however, that the problem, if it were to be
raised today, is somewhat more complicated than it once was. Section
556.170 provides that:
Every person who shall be a principal in the second degree
in the commission of any felony, or who shall be an accessory
to any murder or other felony before the fact, shall, upon con-
viction, be adjudged guilty of the offense in the same degree
and may be charged, tried, convicted and punished in the same
manner, as the principal in the first degree. 115
Although it is clear that this section abolishes whatever distinctions
there were at common law between first degree principals, second
degree principals, and accessories before the fact, in so far as punish-
ment is concerned, 12 our interest is in the question whether it has
any effect on the venue rules. Does this statute permit trial of an
accessory before the fact-a principal in the second degree would
have to be present, at least constructively, at the scene of the crime 53
-in the county where the principal offense was committed if the
acts of accessoryship took place in a different county? And if it were
construed tentatively as having that effect, would the Slater principle
cause the court either to invalidate the statute partly, or to construe
it in a more limited fashion? Putting aside the constitutional prob-
lem, the authorities in other states are not in accord." 4 One can
148. 2 & 3 Edw. 6, c. 24 (1547).
149. See State v. Blunt, 110 Mo. 322, 19 S.W. 650 (1892), discussed in text
supported by notes 106-07 and 110-11, supra.
150. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 541.110 (Vernon 1949). Compare Mo. Rev. Stat. 319, §
18 (1825). The latter statute authorized trial either in the county where the acts
of accessoryship took place or in the county where the principal offense occurred.
The statute was already converted to its present form by 1835. See Mo. Rev.
Stat. 483, § 12 (1835).
151. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 556.170 (Vernon 1949).
152. For an excellent discussion of the law of parties to crimes at common
law, see Perkins, Parties to Crime, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 581 (1941).
153. Ibid.; see also, 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 438 (1st Am. ed. 1847).
154, Compare Carlisle v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. App. 537, 21 S.W. 358 (1893),
with People v. Hodges, 27 Cal. 340 (1865). In the latter case the court said thatr
[T]hough the common law distinction between principal and accessory
is in the main obliterated, yet it is retained for the purposes of venue.
27 Cal. at 342. In Carlisle, the court analyzed the case as turning on whether the
"accomplice to a felony be guilty of a distinct offense from the felony committed
by his principal." 31 Tex. Crim. App. at 537, 21 S.W. at 358. In holding that
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only speculate, but I would hazard that the Missouri court would treat
the statute as permitting trial in either county in such a case, on the
analogy to cases in which the first degree principal is only con-
structively present-i.e., when he uses an innocent agent to con-
summate his purposes, 155 and to misdemeanor cases, in which everyone
who participates sufficiently to be guilty of the offense at all is
guilty as a principal. 15 6 But I must admit that strict adherence to
the rule of 2 and 3 Edward 6 would lead the Missouri court to an
opposite conclusion. 15 7
Receiving
Although the preamble to 2 and 3 Edward 6 suggests that at com-
mon law the receiver of stolen goods was an accessory after the fact to
larceny, that inference should not be drawn. 1 8 Our key date is again
1607, the date as of which English statutes in force are regarded as
part of Missouri's common law."50 Both before and after 2 and 3
Edward 6, there was no separate substantive offense designated re-
ceiving. 60 Nor was the receiver considered as an accessory after the
fact to larceny until 1691, when a statute so designating him was
enacted.' 61 However, there was another method for punishing conduct
which today would be regarded as knowingly receiving stolen prop-
erty.
It was at least theoretically true that anyone with knowledge that a
there was only one crime in such a situation the court relied on the fact that the
punishment was the same, that no such distinction is recognized in misdemeanors,
that principals in the first degree who are only constructively present are treated
as present for venue purposes, and that the general rule of law is that what one
does through another is regarded as done by himself. The court concluded, then,
that the statute abolished the distinction for venue as well as other purposes.
155. See Perkins, supra note 152.
156. Ibid.
157. Accessories after the fact raise no similar problem. They are not treated
with other accessories under Mo. Ann. Stat. § 556.170 (Vernon 1949), but retain
their separate identity under Mo. Ann. Stat. § 556.180 (Vernon 1949); therefore,
they may be tried only in the county where the act of accessoryship takes place.
158. See Starkie, Criminal Pleading 6 n.(n) (1st Am. ed. 1824). See also
2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 447 (8th ed., Curwood 1824), where the author
says:
Also I take it to have been generally agreed,... that neither the re-
ceiving of other men's goods, known to have been stolen, nor the taking
of one's own goods again from one that had stolen them, on an agree-
ment not to prosecute him.... did make a man an accessary to the
felony, unless he also had received the thief. ...
The omitted portions refer to the changes resulting from 3 & 4 Will. & M., c. 9
(1691), and 5 Anne, c. 31, § 5 (1707).
159. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 1.010 (Vernon 1949).
160. See the excellent discussion in Perkins, Criminal Law 276, 442 (1957).
161. 3 Will. & M. c. 9, § 4 (1691). See Perkins, op. cit. supra note 160, at 274;
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felony had been committed by another was under a legal duty to
bring the facts to the attention of the authorities: failure to do so
constituted a common law misdemeanor, known as misprision of
felony.- - How diligently violations of this rule were enforced does
not immediately concern us.1 3 It is clear, however, that it was a
device regularly employed in certain situations, and that one of those
was receiving stolen property. The result was that the receiver was
punished at common law for misprision of felony. 164
Those facts lead to an inquiry about venue in misprision cases
in 1607. Lord Hale is authority for the proposition that although a
grand jury could not return an indictment for any felony partly
committed in one county and partly in another, yet an indictment
charging misprision of that felony could be returned by a grand
jury of either county. 6 : Certainly, whatever other limitations might
be imposed, 1" this would be adequate authority for the suggestion
that at common law the grand jury of the county where the receiving
occurred could take cognizance of the larceny in another county, when
it (lid so for the purpose of determining whether a misprision of
felony had occurred. It is probably also authority for the proposition
that the grand jury of the county where the larceny occurred could
"look into" the county where the act of receiving occurred, provided
it did so to find a basis for returning a misprision indictment.
In spite of this state of affairs, it is frequently said to be the
common law rule that venue in receiving cases was in the county
where the receiving took place.167 But that is much later common
law than that of 1607. It is likely, however, that a statute reflecting
a rule developed after 1607 would be regarded as common law
codification today by the Missouri court. In fact, the Missouri statute
contains just such a provision." In State v. Miller,169 an indictment
returned by the grand jury of Jackson County charged, in two
counts, larceny and receiving. The supreme court reversed a con-
162. Perkins, op. cit. supra note 160, at 274.
163. Perkins, op. cit. supra note 160, at 442 suggests that receiving was one of
the few specific situations to which it was applied. He also suggests, at 377,
that it once was commonly used in connection with the offense of treason.
164. Perkins, op. cit. supra note 160, at 442.
165. 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 652-53 (1st Am. ed. 1847).
166. Lord Hale describes a situation in which persons committing a substan-
tive offense partly in one county and party in another could be convicted of the
substantive offense in neither, but of misprision of that very offense in either.
Ibid.
167. See, e.g., 10 Halsbury's Laws of England § 604 (3d ed., Simonds 1955).
The case relied on in support is Queen v. Martin, 1 Den. 398, 169 Eng. Rep.
297 (1849).
168. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 541.060 (Vernon 1949).
169. 71 Mo. 89 (1879).
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viction of receiving on the ground that, although the evidence tended
to show that the theft occurred in Jackson County, there was a total
failure to prove where the receiving occurred. The court said that
as there was no evidence tending to show that the offense charged
in the second count of the indictment was committed within the
jurisdiction of the court, the judgment rendered upon the verdict
of the jury must be reversed .... While the evidence tends to
show that a part of the stolen goods were [sic] found at the
"place of business" of defendant, it entirely fails to show where
that place of business was .... 170
Because it is clear that the indictment in this case was returned by
the grand jury of the county where the larceny occurred,171 one can
only conclude that trial for receiving is not -permitted in the county
where the theft occurs unless the receiving also occurs there. One
cannot be certain whether this is because (a) the court conceived
the common law rule as so providing, or (b) the statute172 changed
and superseded the common law rule, or (c) the indictment or
place of trial provisions of the constitution173 require such an in-
terpretation of the statute. It is clear, however, that the case is
not a holding that the legislature could not constitutionally provide
for trial of the receiver in either county. It is, then, consistent with
the earlier analysis 174 showing that the gist rule is not one of constitu-
tional law.
Non-Support
Before completing consideration of the statutory efforts to provide
alternative places of trial or otherwise vary common law venue rules,
some attention must be given to the efforts of prosecutors to persuade
the courts to relax the strict rules. These efforts have been made with
respect to quite variant crimes, and with markedly different degrees
of success. The semantic techniques employed by the courts in re-
solving these problems are interesting, and may throw some light
on the resolution of our major problem-constitutional limitations on
legislative power to vary the venue rules.
It will be recalled that one of the reasons frequently advanced for
170. Id. at 90.
171. Ibid. The trial occurred in Clay County, apparently on defendant's
motion for change of venue, but the indictment was found by the grand jury
of Jackson County. There was evidence tending to show the theft occurred ill
Jackson County.
172. No statute is cited in the opinion. The controlling, if valid, statute was
Mo. Gen. Stat. c. 211, § 5 (1865). The statute is indentical to the present Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 541.060 (Vernon 1949).
173. Mo. Const. art. I, §§ 17, 18(a).
174. See text at notes 134-37 supra.
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sustaining the larceny exception to Slater"75 is that larceny is a
"continuing offense."' 76 One line of Missouri cases demonstrates that
this reasoning has proved useful, though in a limited area, in expand-
ing venue rules. If a "continuing offense" is defined narrowly as an
omission to perform a legal duty which continues wherever the
obligor- (or obligee?) -happens to be, the non-support cases im-
mediately come to mind: and a study of Missouri's non-support cases
throws some important light on our inquiry.
An earlier Missouri non-support statute77 was interpreted as re-
quiring that both an abandonment and non-support be shown in order
to prove a violation."' The statute was later amended so that a
showing of either abandonment or non-support was sufficient to
support a conviction. 79
The first case decided under the amended statute was State v.
Christopher.110 Defendant and his wife lived for many years in
Jefferson County, where defendant conducted a business in which
his wife assisted him. The wife at one time instituted suit for divorce
in Jefferson County, but the differences were composed and the
suit dismissed. On February 22, 1923, the defendant came to St. Louis
on business, and the wife closed up the business in Jefferson County
on the same day and came to St. Louis to live with her mother. The
following day she filed suit for divorce in St. Louis. An ancillary
decree enjoined defendant from disposing of his property. The
restraining order was dissolved on March 22, 1923. On March 24,
the wife obtained a warrant charging defendant with failure to sup-
port her on that day. At the close of the case, the defendant's motion
in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence was overruled, even
though the state's attorney confessed that the court was without
jurisdiction to try the offense.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals reversed and ordered defendant
discharged. The court reasoned that venue was in Jefferson County,
because otherwise
the wife may leave the husband at home and take up her resi-
dence in any county in the state which she may elect, and the
venue would become peripatetic; the crime under that theory
being wherever the wife may choose to locate. It needs no
175. Ex parte Slater, 72 Mo. 102 (1880).
176. See text at note 76 supra.
177. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 3274 (1919).
178. State v. Miller, 90 Mo. App. 131 (1901); State v. Weber, 48 Mo. App.
500 (1892).
179. Mo. Laws 281 (1921).
180. 267 S.W. 62 (Mo. App. 1924).
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discussion to show that this cannot be done in this kind of a
case. .... 181
Shortly thereafter, two other cases arose under the statute. One
was appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, the other to the
Springfield Court of Appeals and thence to the supreme court. In
the first of them, State v. Hobbs,182 defendant and his wife were
married, lived and were divorced in Stoddard County. At the time
of the divorce the two children of the marriage were four and five
years old. The mother immediately went with the two children to
Cape Girardeau County, where she obtained a job and supported
herself and her two children, in meager fashion, without help from
the defendant. Defendant remained in Stoddard County, remarried,
and had another family there.
The prosecuting attorney of Cape Girardeau County filed an
information charging defendant with non-support of the two chil-
dren. On appeal from his conviction, defendant contended, inter
alia, that venue was in Stoddard County where he lived. Although
it reversed on other grounds, the St. Louis Court of Appeals dis-
tinguished Christopher'83 and stated that venue was properly laid in
Cape Girardeau County. The court reasoned that
no hard and fast rule can be laid down which will categorically
fix the venue for every case of a failure to support children by a
parent .... The venue of the crime in this character of a case
cannot always follow the father, nor can it in every conceivable
case follow the mother, although she has the children with
her .... 184
Pointing out that the children were not moved about without the
consent of the father, and that prosecution was not begun immediately
after the children were removed from the father's residence, but
only after the residence of the children was clearly established, the
court concluded that the crime, if committed, was committed in Cape
Girardeau County because it was there that
they were being neglected by the father in the necessities of life.
It was there that they were receiving no such contribution as the
law requires the parent to furnish them .... 85
Finally the court alluded to the offense charged as a continuing one,
which "may begin in one jurisdiction and continue in another,"18,
and stated that "in such cases it is generally held that the defendant
181. Id. at 63.
182. 220 Mo. App. 632, 291 S.W. 184 (1929).
183. State v. Christopher, 267 S.W. 62 (Mo. App. 1924).
184. State v. Hobbs, 220 Mo. App. 632, 637, 291 S.W. 184, 185 (1926).
185. Id. at 638, 291 S.W. at 184.
186. Ibid.
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may be tried in either county."8i  The latter statement enabled the
court to distinguish abandonment cases (single act) from non-support
cases (continuing omission).
The facts in State v. Winterbauer18 were similar to those in Hobbs.
Defendant married the complaining witness after illicit sexual inter-
course with her resulted in the conception of a child. They lived
together but a few days, when defendant sent her to her father
in Oregon County, Missouri, where she and the child of the marriage
lived from then on. Defendant, living in St. Louis, refused to support
the child, and finally notified the complaining witness by letter that
he was through with her. He was tried and convicted, in Oregon
County, for non-support of the child.
Reversing for other reasons, the Springfield Court of Appeals
nevertheless stated that venue was in Oregon County, relying on the
Hobbs characterization of the offense as a "continuing" one. 89 The
court buttressed its conclusion by pointing out that in the instant case
the complaining witness and the child resided in Oregon County at the
express direction of the defendant. 90
On appeal, the supreme court agreed that venue had properly been
laid in Oregon County.1' The court stated that the father's duty to
support followed the mother and child "wherever he sent them."'19 2
The court, however, also approved Hobbs, and it will be recalled that
there the wife and children went to another county, not at the father's
direction, but because of the necessity for finding a means of support.
But it may be significant that in quoting from Hobbs, the supreme
court did not refer explicitly to the "continuing offense" language in
that case.
But the reliance of the two courts of appeals on the "continuing
offense" concept needs further analysis. If it be conceded that the
duty to support continues wherever the father may be and wherever
the child may be, and if it be further conceded that an omission to
perform that duty does not happen at a single point of time, but "con-
tinues," still recognition of the "continuing offense" concept seems to
have little bearing on whether the venue should be the father's place
of residence or that of the neglected child. To elaborate: suppose (1)
the charge is that the father failed to support for a period of one year
prior to the filing of the information, and (2) the facts are that the
father lived for six months in County A and six months in County B
187. Ibid.
188. 296 S.W. 219 (Mo. App.), aff'd. 318 Mo. 693, 300 S.W. 1071 (1927).
189. 296 S.W. at 222.
190. Ibid.
191. State v. Winterbauer, 318 Mo. 693, 300 S.W. 1071 (1927).
192. Id. at 697, 300 S.W. at 1073.
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during that year. Now a "continuing offense" concept clearly would
be relevant to a finding that the defendant could be tried in either
County A or County B, provided that the proper venue is in the
county where the defendant resides. On the other hand suppose the
same charge and that defendant lived in County A throughout the
year, but the child lived for six months in County X and six months
in County Y. Again the "continuing offense" concept would be rele-
vant in determining that defendant could be tried in either County X
or County Y, provided that proper venue is in the county where the
child resides. The courts of appeals have implicitly utilized the "con-
tinuing offense" concept to hold that venue may be where the child
resides, even though the residence of neither father nor child has
changed. Presumably the father's place of residence is also a proper
venue, although the point cannot be regarded as clearly settled. 1 3
The result reached by the court is thus completely out of line with
the basic assumptions of Missouri jurisprudence in this area-it does
not fit in with the gist rule. In terms of results, the courts have rec-
ognized in these cases that crimes frequently are committed partly in
one county and partly in another. I do not mean to suggest that this
recognition is expressly offered by the courts; it is, however, the
rationale which fits the results of the cases. The result is that there
may be a choice of venue, at least in the non-support cases, a choice
which, as we shall see,19 4 is denied to prosecutors in analogous areas.
Attempts and Conspiracies
It is rare for a crime to suit the concept of a "continuing offense"
as neatly as those omission cases, in which the duty to render aid or
support extends over a period of time. Still two of the traditional
inchoate crimes, attempt and conspiracy, comfortably wear the label
"continuing." It must be admitted that any member of a conspiracy
or anyone attempting a crime becomes guilty at a particular point in
time, although in a conspiracy of more than two persons, guilt may
attach to one member at one time, and to other members at a different
time.195 Nevertheless, conspiracies generally, and attempts often, con-
193. It is possible that in any particular non-support case, proper venue may
be only where the father resides, whereas in another particular non-support
case, proper venue may be only where the child resides. In short, it is possible
that there is only one proper venue in any given non-support case. This seems
unlikely, but it is a possibility not conclusively ruled out by the language of the
opinions.
194. See text at notes 196-225 infra.
195. Certain rules which apply to the crime of conspiracy have become
so well settled as not to require exposition or citation of authority. These
are: (a) That a person may be convicted of a conspiracy to commit a
defined substantive offense against the law, even though such latter
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sist of a series of acts extending over a period of time and occurring
in different places.
I have been unsuccessful in finding common law venue rules in at-
tempt cases prior to 1607. Missouri has no statutory provision relat-
ing to the problem. Two cases, however, deserve consideration. In
State v. Terry,'9 a fraternal organization incorporated in Maryland
had for one of its purposes the payment of death benefits to bene-
ficiaries of deceased members. As part of a scheme to defraud, de-
fendant and others initiated a dying man into a Missouri chapter of
the organization. Upon the initiate's death, the defendant and others
presented proofs of death-with a false cause of death-to the Mis-
souri Council for forwarding to the headquarters in Maryland, which
was done. The scheme was discovered before any payment was made.
Defendant and others were indicted for attempted false pretenses in
Missouri. Although the conviction was reversed on other grounds, the
Supreme Court of Missouri rejected defendant's contention that be-
cause "the money (if any) to be obtained was to be obtained in Mary-
land"' ' the crime was committed there and not in Missouri. The court
said:
The charge in the case at bar is not of a consummated crime,
but of an attempt to commit the crime. Such attempts are cog-
nizable in the place where made.... The venue of the offense was,
therefore, properly laid as being within this state. 98
State z. Fraker'I" presents a more complicated set of facts, and a
somewhat different view of venue in attempts cases. Defendant, a
resident of Clay County, obtained an insurance policy in Ray County.
He executed a will, probably in Clay County. He then went to a spot
on the Missouri River in Ray County, where he pretended to drown
himself. In any event he disappeared until he was found much later
hiding in the woods in Minnesota. In the meantime, his executor, who
believed defendant to be dead and was otherwise entirely innocent,
presented defendant's will for probate in Clay County. The executor,
after presenting proofs of death to the insurance company, instituted
suit upon the policy in Clay County. After the case was removed to a
offense be actually and entirely consummated; (b) that a person who
knowingly enters into a conspiracy after its formation, but before it is
ended, is equally as guilty as are those who were in it at its formation;
and (c) that a criminal conspiracy once formed continues until the
object of it has been accomplished unless abandoned short of an overt
act, or broken up by the arrest of the participants.
Farris, J., in McDonald v. United States, 89 F.2d. 128, 133 (8th Cir. 1937).
196. 109 Mo. 601, 19 S.W. 206 (1891).
197. See summary of defendant's contentions, id. at 602, 19 S.W. at 206.
198. Id. at 622, 19 S.W. at 212.
199. 148 Mo. 143, 49 S.W. 1017 (1899).
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federal court, judgment in favor of the executor was entered by agree-
ment. Apparently the scheme was discovered before any payment was
actually made.
On these facts, the grand jury of Ray County indicted defendant for
attempted false pretences. His conviction was reversed on several
grounds,200 among them that venue was not in Ray County because
.no act which went beyond preparation was done there. The court
stated that
all of the acts alleged, constitute in the aggregate, but one alleged
attempt, but this series of acts is scattered through several coun-
ties .... When, as here, a crime consisting [sic] of a series of
acts, part done in one county and part in another, it is dispunish-
able at common law in either, unless enough be done in one county
to amount to a completed and punishable act ... ; and this rule
holds in the absence of statutory enactment to the contrary....
(Whether such a statute would be valid under our organic law
is dehors the present record.)202
200. Among others was the insufficiency of the indictment. Id. at 156, 49 S.W.
at 1019.
201. Id. at 159-60, 49 S.W. at 1021. Reference should also be made to two
prosecutions under what is now Mo. Ann. Stat. § 557.090 (Vernon 1949). That
section among other things makes it a crime ". . . by bribery, menace or other
means, directly or indirectly [to] induce or attempt to induce any witness, ... to
absent himself or avoid a subpoena or other process .... " (Emphasis added.)
In both cases money was offered to a witness in a case to leave the jurisdiction
so as to avoid testifying, and in both cases the bribe was accepted. In each case
the offer was made and accepted in one county, but the actual payment was made
in another. Each prosecution was in the county where the offer was made and
accepted rather than the one in which the payment was made. In both cases,
venue was held properly laid. State v. Ballew, 56 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. App. 1933);
State v. Tummons, 225 Mo. App. 429, 37 S.W.2d 499 (1931).
In Tummons, the court stated that the gist of the statutory offense was the
offer or attempt. Two things should be noted: (1) in a sense this becomes another
attempt case and simply supports the general rule expressed in the cases discussed
in the text that venue for an attempt is laid properly in the county where the
attempt is made; but (2) Mo. Ann. Stat. § 556.160 (Vernon 1949) provides that
there can be no conviction of an attempt if the offense attempted was actually per-
petrated. Of course, the latter statute is not explicitly applicable to common law
attempts which have been labeled substantive offenses by statute, like the attempt
in the principal case. But, since the court treated the case like any other attempt,
a thorough consideration of § 556.160 might have led it to the conclusion that
the attempt could not be prosecuted because the crime had been consummated.
The point was not raised.
It is very doubtful that the court would have stressed the attempt aspect if
the prosecution had occurred in the county where the payment was made, for
this would have led it to deny venue there, a totally unreasonable result.
One might conclude that when a statute makes the crime the same whether
it is merely attempted or actually consummated, the prosecutor has a choice of
trying the case in either county. Of course, if § 556.160 applies to such offenses,
there could be no prosecution in the county where the attempt was made.
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Two things seem clear. (1) In the absence of statute, the proper
venue in an attempt case is basically where the attempt is made. But
in the usual situation, a course of "preparation" is carried out before
the actor proceeds far enough to be guilty of an attempt. If that
preparation is carried out in County A, and the act which enables the
court to say that the conduct passes from the category of preparation
to the category of perpetration occurs in County B, the trial must take
place in County B, if, indeed, there can be a trial. (2) The court has
never passed on the question whether a statute permitting trial in
either county would fall afoul of the Slater rule-in short Fraker is
not a holding that the gist rule is one of constitutional law in Mis-
souri. Some attempts are "continuing" offenses at least to the extent
that larcenies are, and if the "continuing offense" rationale is applica-
ble to cases other than larceny, a statute providing for multiple venue
in those attempt cases should be sustained.
The problem of venue in conspiracy cases is decidedly more com-
plicated. Prior to 1611*2- the law of conspiracy was so limited that it
is of little help to us. Although the common law rule is sometimes
said to be that venue in conspiracy cases is in the county where the
agreement was reached,! '3 it has also been said that venue may be laid
in any county where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy oc-
curred.LO4 But both statements refer to the common law of a time well
after 1607. Consequently history does not help us much. Further-
more, the absence of both statutory provisions and decided cases in
Missouri is a handicap. In these circumstances one can do no more
202. This date is selected because it marks the time when the doctrine that
a conspiracy had to be carried out in order to constitute a crime was abandoned.
See The Poulterers' Case, 9 Co. Rep. 55b, 77 Eng. Rep. 813 (Ct. of Star Ch.
1611). For a discussion of the history of conspiracy, see Wright, The Law of
Criminal Conspiracies and Agreements 5-7 (1891).
203. 1 Russell, op. cit. supra note 1, at 185. Russell did not say that venue
was exclusively in the county where the agreement was reached. See the next
footnote.
204. See Starkie, op. cit. supra note 72, at 30-31. See also 10 Halsbury's Laws
of England § 607 (3d ed., Simonds 1955), where the following passage appears:
Conspiracy may be tried in the place where the conspirators agreed
to do the wrongful act which is the object of the conspiracy, but as the
place of agreement is often unknown, conspiracy is generally a matter
of inference deduced from criminal acts of the accused persons which
are done in pursuance of a common criminal purpose, and are often
not confined to one place; a charge of conspiracy may consequently be
laid at common law in any county where one of these criminal acts is
committed.
The cases relied on in support, however, were decided nearly 200 years after
1607. See also 1 Russell, op. cit. supra note 1, at 185.
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than examine the nature of the crime, and particularly the relation-
ship between the law of conspiracy and that of parties to crime.
The inchoate crime of conspiracy was complete at common law
when an agreement to do an unlawful act by lawful means or a lawful
act by unlawful means was entered into.205 It was not necessary to
prove any overt act other than the act of agreeing.206 It was also true
that a conspirator became criminally liable for the acts of other con-
spirators pursuant to the agreement.20 7 But the latter liability was
that of a party to the crime itself-in felonies as an accessory before
the fact 0o or as a principal in the second degree ;209 in misdemeanors
as a principal (for the law of parties applied only to felonies) .210 It is
important, therefore, to separate conspiracy convictions from those of
the criminal offenses growing out of conspiracies.211 It would seem
logical, therefore, that if the question is where may a conspirator be
tried for crimes committed by a fellow conspirator, the venue rules
relating to parties will control, but that if the question is where may
a conspirator be tried for the crime of conspiracy itself, those rules
are immaterial. Logically, again, the place of indictment and trial
would be the place where the agreement was entered into, for it is
there that the minimum common law requirements for the crime of
conspiracy are met. It is perhaps due to a failure to keep these ques-
tions separate that the rules as developed by the later common law
cases are not entirely consistent with the general principle that the
venue is where the gist of the crime occurs.
The situation in Missouri is further complicated by the fact that the
common law conspiracy rules have been changed for some conspir-
acies, but not for others. Following a section which defines conspiracy
205. After discussing various common law definitions, Professor Perkins offers
the following: "A conspiracy is a combination for an unlawful purpose." Perkins,
Criminal Law 529 (1957).
206. Id. at 531. See also note 202 supra.
207. Id. at 546.
208. An accessory before the fact is one who is guilty of felony by reason
of having aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged the commission
thereof, without having been present either actually or constructively at
the moment of perpetration. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 575.
209. A principal in the second degree is one who is guilty of felony by
reason of having aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged the com-
mission thereof in his presence, either actual or constructive. (Emphasis
added.)
Id. at 570.
210. Id. at 567.
211. The law relating to venue in accessoryship cases has already been dis-
cussed (see text at notes 146-47 supra), and is not affected by the fact that the
accessory before the fact is nearly always guilty of conspiracy as well.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1958/iss1/8
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON VENUE
broadly, 12 giving the term substantially its common law meaning,
section 556.130 imposes additional requirements in some but not all
cases:
No agreement, except to commit a felony upon the person of
another, or to commit arson or burglary, shall be deemed a con-
spiracy unless some act besides such agreement be done to effect
the object thereof, by one or more of the parties to such agree-
ment 1
In short, (1) if the agreement is to commit a felony upon the person
or to commit arson or burglary, the common law concept, which does
not require an additional overt act, is adopted, but (2) no other agree-
ment becomes a conspiracy until some overt act occurs in addition to
the act of agreeing.
Rigorous adherence to the common law concept of venue as modified
by the gist rule would suggest that for conspiracies falling within
the first class, the place where the agreement was reached is the
proper, and exclusive, venue, but that conspiracies falling within the
second class should be prosecuted where an additional overt act was
done, since that overt act is necessary to complete the crime. Because
ordinarily many overt acts are done, not infrequently in different
counties, it is likely that venue would be in any county where an overt
act was done. If, but only if, we superimpose on this scheme a "con-
tinuing offense" concept-and, at that, one delineated more carefully
than in the larceny cases-we could also say that the place of agree-
ment would be a proper place of trial even if no additional overt act
were perpetrated in that county.
But the above analysis is not only theoretical; it is complex. More
practically, the court might not separate the two kinds of conspiracy
for venue purposes, and might employ the "continuing offense" con-
cept to hold that venue in any conspiracy case could be in the county
where the agreement was entered into or where any additional overt
act took place. The probabilities in favor of the adoption of this solu-
212. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 556.120 (Vernon 1949) provides:
If two or more persons shall agree, conspire, combine or confederate:
First, to commit any offense; or, second, falsely or maliciously to indict
another for any offense, or procure another to be charged or arrested for
any offense; or, third, falsely or maliciously to move or maintain any
suit; or, fourth, to cheat and defraud any person of any money or
property, by means which are in themselves criminal; or, fifth, to cheat
and defraud any person of any money or property by any means which,
if executed, would amount to a cheat, or to obtaining money or property
by false pretenses; or, sixth, to commit any act injurious to the public
health, or public morals, or for the perversion or obstruction of justice,
or the due administration of the laws, they shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor.
213. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 556.130 (Vernon 1949).
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tion are increased by the fact that conspiracy is frequently described
as a "continuing offense," though, it is true, for quite a different pur-
pose.214 In any event, such speculation aids us in solving our primary
problem only by pointing out certain areas in which it is not unlikely
that the Missouri courts will utilize the "continuing offense" concept
to expand the venue rules.
Burglary and Robbery
The major effort to expand the larceny exception has been made in
the area of crimes of appropriation other than larceny, and of bur-
glary, itself an offense against the habitation but normally committed
for the purpose of and resulting in larceny. An early statutory effort
to include the crimes of burglary and robbery under the larceny ex-
ception dates back to 1835,215 and appeared in the Revised Statutes of
1879 in the following language:
When property stolen in one county and brought into another,
shall have been taken by larceny, burglary or robbery, the of-
fender may be indicted, tried and convicted for such larceny, bur-
glary or robbery in the county in which such stolen property was
brought, in the same manner as if such larceny, burglary or rob-
bery had been committed in that county.216
In State v. McGraw,21 7 defendant committed burglary and larceny
in Clinton County, and shortly thereafter brought the fruits of the
crime into Jackson County. Indicted and convicted there for both
larceny and burglary, he appealed his conviction. The court reversed
and remanded his larceny conviction because of an error in admitting
evidence, and then reversed his burglary conviction outright for im-
proper venue. In doing so, the court necessarily invalidated the
statute to the extent that it applied to the crime of burglary. It rea-
soned that the larceny exception to Slater was based on the theory
that each transportation of stolen goods into another county consti-
tuted a fresh theft, and held this theory inapplicable to the crime
of burglary. The court has since held that, for double jeopardy pur-
poses, there is only one larceny in such a situation, dismissing the
earlier cases as merely relating to venue.21s It is difficult to assess the
effect of this later decision on McGraw. Two reasons for continuing
214. Ordinarily conspiracy is spoken of as a continuing offense when the
question is whether persons not parties to the conspiracy at the time certain
overt acts are done may nevertheldss be held responsible therefor.
215. Mo. Rev. Stat. 483, § 14 (1835).
216. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1691 (1879).
217. 87 Mo. 161 (1885).
218. See State v. Bockman, 344 Mo. 80, 124 S.W.2d 1205 (1939), discussed
in text at notes 84-89 supra.
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to adhere to McGraw present themselves: (1) the fresh theft theory,
though unsound, is still valid for determining venue; and (2) other
reasons not affected by Bocknan for confining the exception to lar-
ceny have frequently been stated. It will be recalled that the court has
described larceny as a "continuing offense," and that the common law
exception was confined to larceny219 Certainly it is doubtful that bur-
glary could be described as a "continuing offense" in any meaningful
sense, and it is clear that burglary was not included within the larceny
exception at common law.22-  Furthermore, it is difficult to conceive of
burglary as being partly committed in one county and partly in an-
other.
Although no Missouri cases have been found construing the statu-
tory attempt to extend the larceny exception to robbery, the following
observations seem appropriate. It is clear that at common law the
larceny exception did not extend to cases of robbery221 On the other
hand because robbery is simply an aggravated form of larceny, it,
like larceny, requires an asportation.222 But any fictional subsequent
asportation could only be one of the kind found in simple larceny
cases, i.e., it would not have the elements of force or coercion essen-
tial to robbery. Therefore, the rationale which justifies the larceny
exception, on the ground that each carrying into a new county involves
a fresh asportation and so a fresh theft, seems even more nebulous in
the robbery cases. In the same sense, the "continuing offense" concept
also fits robbery less readily than it does a simple larceny. But it must
be remembered that both of these rationales are based on abstractions
-indeed on fictions-so that practical analysis is difficult. It could be
maintained, certainly, that the larceny is a "continuing offense" for
the reason that benefiting from its fruits is an essential objective of it,
and that the same thing is true of robbery. And that explanation is,
in any event, no less realistic than the whole complex analytical struc-
ture built up by the common law to solve venue problems. In view of
the weakened position of the fresh asportation rationale,223 the addi-
tional conceptual complexities involved in treating robbery as a "con-
tinuing offense," and, most important of all, the fact that robbery did
not fall within the exception at common law, make it doubtful that the
219. See text at notes 75-76 supra.
220. This seems an obvious conclusion from the fact that even robbery, a
compound larceny, did not fall within the exception. 2 Russell, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 1238.
221. 2 East, Pleas of the Crown 772 (1803).
222. Ibid.; Perkins, Criminal Law 236-37 (1957).
223. See text at notes 84-89 supra.
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court would sustain an isolated statute simply lumping robbery with
larceny for venue purposes.224
Embezzlement and False Pretences
The preceding analysis of burglary and robbery would not apply to
the other major crimes of appropriation, embezzlement and false pre-
tences. But the Missouri courts have consistently, both explicitly and
implicitly, refused to extend the venue rules for larceny to them. 22
Detailed examination of the cases would not be useful, but they are
cited in the previous footnote so that the doubting may verify my
conclusion. It is important, however, to note that the amount of time
and money spent in litigating venue issues in embezzlement and false
pretences cases has been substantial, has undoubtedly been a hardship
to accused persons, and has certainly placed a heavy burden on tax-
payers. Because in none of them has the court held that the gist rule
is a rule of constitutional law, the latest development may be viewed
without having the results of the inspection foreclosed.
"Stealing"
In 1955, the Missouri Legislature, as part of a general revision of
the criminal appropriation sections, combined the offenses which
previously fell under the general headings of (1) larceny, (2) larceny
by trick, (3) embezzlement and (4) obtaining property by false pre-
tences.2 2 6 The single section delineating the new offense labels it
"stealing. ' 227 As part of the revision, section -541.070 was amended to
read as follows:
224. This position may seem inconsistent with that taken in the text supported
by notes 236-38 infra, with respect to the stealing statute. I suggest, however,
that permitting a prosecution for robbery in the second county, like permitting
one for burglary, is quite a different thing, both factually and conceptually, from
permitting a prosecution for a crime of appropriation alone in the second county,
whether or not circumstances attended the crime of appropriation that made it
also an offence against the person or the habitation.
225. The following cases deal with venue problems in embezzlement. State v.
Fluesmeier, 318 Mo. 803, 1 S.W.2d 133 (1927); State v. Fischer, 297 Mo. 164,
249 S.W. 46 (1923) ; State v. Sheets, 289 S.W. 553 (Mo. 1926) ; State v. Bouslog,
266 Mo. 73, 180 S.W. 859 (1915) ; State v. Mispagel, 207 Mo. 557, 106 S.W. 513
(1907); State v. Shour, 196 Mo. 202, 95 S.W. 405 (1906); State v. Bacon, 170
Mo. 161, 70 S.W. 473 (1902); State v. Hatch, 91 Mo. 568, 4 S.W. 502 (1887).
The following cases deal with venue problems in false pretences: State v.
Page, 186 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. App. 1945); State v. Mandel, 353 Mo. 502, 183
S.W.2d 59 (1944); State v. Marion, 235 Mo. 359, 138 S.W. 491 (1911); State v.
Lichliter, 95 Mo. 402, 8 S.W. 720 (1888); State v. Shaeffer, 89 Mo. 271, 1 S.W.
293 (1886); State v. Dennis, 80 Mo. 589 (1883).
226. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 560.156 (Vernon Supp. 1957).
227. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 560.156 (2) (Vernon Supp. 1957).
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When property is stolen or taken by robbery in one county and
brought into another the offender may be prosecuted for such
stealing or robbery in the county into which such stolen property
was brought in the same manner as if such stealing or robbery
had been committed in that county.22 8
The problem that immediately suggests itself is whether conduct
formerly denominated embezzlement, or conduct formerly denomi-
nated false pretences, but now called, along with the old larceny and
the old larceny by trick, "stealing," is triable in a county where the
gist of the offense could not be said to have occurred under the older
labels. The Missouri Supreme Court has in the past differentiated the
other appropriation crimes from larceny on the ground that the
former do not require asportation, 229 and has, therefore, refused to
apply to them the venue rules for larceny. It could now sustain the
validity of this part of the new statute only by distinguishing or over-
ruling its earlier cases.2 31
It is true, of course, that some of the other reasons advanced for
differentiating larceny from other crimes for venue purposes could be
emphasized. If those reasons are equally applicable to crimes of
appropriation other than larceny, they could be used as arguments
that those other crimes should be treated like larceny for venue pur-
poses. First, the argument could be made that the offense is really
transporting property, obtained by criminal appropriation, from one
county to another, and that the label placed on the conduct is imma-
terial.21 An obvious fiction, rejected as a basis for avoiding double
jeopardy problems,232 this reasoning might still be used to support the
venue in larceny cases. 2 3 And if the fact that it is a fiction is no ob-
stacle there, it should be none in cases arising under the new stealing
statute. Second, any form of stealing under that statute could be,
labeled "continuing" with as much factual justification as common law
larceny.
The two rationales, however, are not likely to be accorded equal
validity. It is true that stealing and larceny are equally continuous,,
228. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 541.070 (Vernon Supp. 1957).
229. Embezzlement-State v. Hatch, 91 Mo. 568, 4 S.W. 502 (1887). False
Pretences-State v. Fraker, 148 Mo. 143, 49 S.W. 1017 (1899).
230. See text supported by notes 231-38 infra for some suggested means of
distinguishing the earlier cases.
231. See text supported by notes 84-89 supra for discussion of this rationale
employed in larceny cases, as well as its limitation to venue problems.
232. Ibid.
233. The fact that in State v. Boekman, 344 Mo. 80, 124 S.W.2d 1205 (1939),
discussed in text supported by notes 84-89 supra, the court, in rejecting the
rationale for double jeopardy purposes, nevertheless recognized its previous use
for venue purposes, leaves it at least arguable that it can still be utilized in
solving certain venue problems.
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but it is also true that the same could always have been said-and was
not-of embezzlement and false pretences. 2 4 It seems unlikely that
the court would at this late date repudiate the reasoning underlying
so many cases. On the other hand, the legislature had never previ-
ously attempted expressly to include embezzlement and false pre-
tences within the venue statute for larceny. All efforts to apply the
larceny rule to such cases had been made by prosecutors without
statutory direction. At this point the fact that the court has never
held the gist rule to be one of constitutional law is vital. For now the
court can say that the legislature has made it a crime-for venue
purposes only, it will be recalled 23 -- for a thief to transport the fruits
of "stealing" into another county.
Two arguments against any such conclusion could be made: (1) the
legislative attempt to do the same thing for burglary ran afoul of
Slater ;236 (2) the real basis for the larceny exception to Slater is the
historical common law. Against the first of these arguments is the
fact that burglary is a crime complete without any "fruits" being ob-
tained at all,2 37 and, therefore, in a sense not so readily describable as
"continuing," as crimes of appropriation are. It is possible then that
the legislature is powerless to provide for multiple venue in burglary
cases while it is at the same time empowered to provide for it in
crimes of appropriation. Furthermore, the court has permitted one
who committed both burglary and larceny in the same transaction in
County A to be prosecuted in County B for the larceny, if he carried
the fruits of the crimes into County B.238 It is nearly impossible to
imagine a case in which one commits a burglary in County A and
carries the fruits thereof into County B, without also committing lar-
ceny in County A. Consequently, it is not unreasonable to conclude
that the court has already permitted the legislature to make a crime
of transportation out of larceny or larceny and burglary combined,
when the thief takes the goods into another county, but has refused to
permit it to make two crimes of this same act, even for venue pur-
poses.
The second objection is more difficult to rebut. Only by explicitly
234. Care should be taken here to note that the cases did not say that
embezzlement and false pretences were not continuing offenses. Rather the
failure to use the continuing offense rationale is some evidence that the court
did not believe it appropriate.
235. See text supported by notes 84-89 supra.
236. See State v. McGraw, 87 Mo. 161 (1885), discussed in text supported
by notes 217-20 supra.
237. Perkins, Criminal Law 166 (1957). I.e., burglary is not necessarily
committed for the purpose of stealing, and even when that is the purpose, the
crime is complete even though that purpose is never achieved.
238. State v. McGraw, 87 Mo. 161 (1885).
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recognizing legislative power to vary the gist rule in appropriate
cases and by finding a legislative intention to do so for crimes of
appropriation, could the court sustain the statute without overruling
Slater and the cases decided in reliance on its principles. I would
hazard a guess that the court will sustain the statute, though not
necessarily on reasoning paralleling my own.
In summary, then, it appears that carefully drafted legislation
making it clear that the gist rule is being abolished would solve some
of the problems raised by the cases in Missouri. That would hold true
of cases falling in class 3-those in which there is no doubt where
every part of the total course of criminal conduct occurred, but where
-at least acording to some rational view of the matter-some sig-
nificant part occurred in one county and another significant part oc-
curred in another county. Later in this article I will suggest the gen-
eral outlines of the kind of legislation I believe appropriate to accom-
plish that purpose.
That legislation, however, could have no effect on the problems
arising in class 2-those in which there is doubt-perhaps unresolv-
able under ordinary burden of proof rules-where some significant
part of the total course of criminal conduct occurred. The constitu-
tional barrier imposed by the Slater case would clearly stand in the
way of any direct attempt to resolve doubts by the use of presump-
tions or by arbitrary fiat. But certain Missouri statutes and cases
need further attention in order to evaluate accurately the solidity of
that constitutional barrier.
WAIVER
Missouri courts have held that the constitutional guarantee of trial
in the county where the crime was committed is a personal privilege
which may be waived ;2.9 it is, therefore, important to explore the cir-
cumstances under which a waiver might be found. Since Missouri
authority is so scant on the point, much of what follows must be clas-
sified as speculation and conjecture.
If a waiver of the guarantee is ever possible, it is obvious that one
would be found when a defendant deliberately and expressly asks for
a trial in another county. This is merely a long way of saying that a
statute giving defendant a right to a change of venue under certain
circumstances is not unconstitutional, a self-evident proposition.
When the possible waiver is not intentional, or at least not made
explicit, difficulties arise.
239. State v. Cobb, 359 Mo. 373, 221 S.W.2d 745 (1949); State v. Page, 186
S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1945). See also State v. Wilson, 66 Mo. App. 540 (1896).
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The following statutory provisions are relevant.
Section 541.120:
When it appears at any time before verdict or judgment that
the defendant is prosecuted in a county not having jurisdiction
of the offense, the court may order that all the papers and pro-
ceedings be certified and transmitted to the proper court of the
proper county, and recognize the defendant to appear before such
court on the first day of the next term thereof, to await the action
of the grand jury. The witnesses shall also be recognized to ap-
pear at such court, that the prosecution may be proceeded with
as provided by law.2 40
Section 541.130:
When a jury has been impaneled in the case contemplated in
section 541.120, such jury shall be discharged without prejudice
to the prosecution.2 4 1
Section 541.140:
If the defendant be in actual custody or confinement, the body
of the defendant shall be removed to the jail of the proper county,
in like manner and with like effect, in all respects, as in cases of
change of venue.24
2
Section 541.150:
The provisions of law relating to changes of venue shall, in all
respects, as far as they may be applicable, govern in cases pro-
vided in sections 541.120 to 541.140; and the defendant, officers
and witnesses shall be subject to the same duties and penalties as
are enjoined and inflicted by law upon like persons, as in cases of
change of venue. 24 3
Those sections of the statutes must be considered in connection with
the following rules of criminal procedure.
Rule 25.06:
(a) Any defense or objection which is capable of determination
without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial
by motion.
(b) Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution
of the proceedings or in the indictment or information other than
that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an
offense may be raised by motion before trial. Failure to present
such defenses or objections constitutes a waiver thereof, but the
court for kood cause shown may grant relief from such waiver.
Lack of jurisdiction or the failure of an indictment or informa-
tion to charge an offense may be noticed by the court at any time
during the pendency of the proceeding.
2 44
240. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 541.120 (Vernon 1949).
241. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 541.130 (Vernon 1949).
242. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 541.140 (Vernon 1949).
243. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 541.150 (Vernon 1949).
244. Mo. R. Crim. P. 25.06.
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Rule 26.02:
(4) If the defendant's counsel shall have reserved his opening
statement until the close of the state's case-in-chief, he may then
state his defense, or if such statement has already been made, he
may next offer evidence in support thereof, or he may by proper
motion challenge the sufficiency of the state's case-in-chief to
sustain a conviction. (Emphasis added.) 245
Rule 26.10:
Motions for directed verdict are abolished and motions forjudgment of acquittal are substituted in their place. The court
either on motion of a defendant, or its own motion, shall order
entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged by
indictment or information if, after the evidence on either side is
closed, the court concludes as a matter of law that such evidence
is not sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction of such offense
or offenses. If a defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at
the close of the state's case-in-chief is not granted the defendant
may offer evidence without having reserved the right.246
Rule 24.07:
It shall not be necessary to state any venue in the body of any
indictment or information, but the county or other jurisdiction
named in the margin thereof shall be taken to be the venue for all
the facts stated in the body of the same. 24 7
Two main possibilities present themselves: (1) the indictment or in-
formation may show improper venue on its face; or (2) proof offered
under a proper indictment or information may disclose incorrect
venue, or even fail to show any venue. First, some possible situations
arising from an indictment or information showing a defective venue
on its face will be considered.
It is, of course, inconceivable that an information filed by the prose-
cuting attorney of County A should name in its margin a county other
than County A. In spite of the fact that rule 24.07 makes it unneces-
sary to state any additional venue,248 still it is not unlikely that facts
relating to venue would be included in the body of an information or
indictment. Although such a pleading would not state that all of the
acts took place in a county other than noted in the margin, it is again
not unlikely that it would contain allegations that certain acts took
place in a different county. For instance it might allege in a false pre-
tences case249 being tried in County A that the title to the property
245. Mo. R. Crim. P. 26.02(4).
246. Mo. R. Crim. P. 26.10, as amended Oct. 11, 1954, effective July 1, 1955.
247. Mo. R. Crim. P. 24.07.
248. Ibid.
249. Although obtaining property by false pretences is no longer a separate
offense, having been subsumed under the heading "stealing" along with other
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passed in County B as a result of false representations made in County
A. This, of course, would result from a failure to read properly the
Missouri cases dealing with the question of venue in false pretences
cases. 250 It would be, in an important sense, a defect in the indictment
or information apparent on its face.
What must a defendant do in such a situation in order to avoid
waiving the defect, and what will be the consequences of any action
he might take? The first question to be answered is whether the de-
fect is one which "fails to show jurisdiction in the court" within the
meaning of that phrase as found in rule 25.06.251 Because the Mis-
souri courts have held that the guarantee of trial where the crime is
committed is merely a personal privilege capable of being waived,212
it is clear that a waiver does not have the effect of conferring on the
court jurisdiction by consent. Or to put it in more usual terms, the
constitutional guarantee as currently interpreted applies to jurisdic-
tion over the person and not to jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the proceeding. It also seems clear that the purpose of the rule was
to preserve, as not subject to waiver, two basic objections-in the
older terminology, failure to state a cause of action and lack of juris-
diction over the subject-matter of the action. 25 3 An example of the
latter would be an effort to try a felony in a court which only has
jurisdiction to try misdemeanors.
If the above interpretation of the rule is sound, the defendant in our
hypothetical situation would be required to act, or would be held to
have waived the venue objection. Furthermore, subject to some dis-
cretion in the trial judge, he must act promptly, that is, by motion
before trial.254 But what form should his action take? It is at this
point that the relation between this rule and the statutory sections
set out above becomes important. The defendant should move to
transfer to the proper county, in accordance with the provisions of
sections 541.120 to 541.150.255 If, instead, he moves to dismiss, I as-
crimes of appropriation by Mo. Ann. Stat. § 560.156 (Vernon Supp. 1957), it is
not at all certain that the venue difficulties have been eliminated. See discussion,
text at notes 234-38 supra. In any event it provides the clearest illustration of
the problem.
The Missouri cases clearly establish proper venue in false pretence cases
to be the county where title to the property passes rather than that in which
the false representation was made. See the cases cited in note 225 supra.
250. Ibid.
251. Mo. R. Crim. P. 25.06(b).
252. See note 239 supra.
253. The federal provision is the same as the Missouri provision. See Fed.
R. Crim. P. 12(b)-(2).
254. See Mo. R. Crim. P. 25.06.
255. Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 541.120-.150 (Vernon 1949).
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sume that the trial judge would deny the motion, but would treat it as
a motion to transfer as above. Consequently, it seems clear that if the
venue defect is apparent on the face of the indictment or information,
the defendant should not be discharged if he objects to venue, but his
case should be transferred to the appropriate county. If he does not
object, he waives his privilege to be tried in the county where the
crime was committed. Of this procedure it can be said that it avoids
turning loose accused persons on technical grounds unrelated to the
merits, but, on the other hand, it is cumbersome and relatively expen-
sive, not only for the accused, but for witnesses and the state as well.
Problems next arise when the indictment or information is not sub-
ject to motion, but the proof is in some way defective. Two principal
variations suggest themselves. The first of them can again be illus-
trated hypothetically. An information is filed charging defendant
with the crime of obtaining property by false pretences. The venue
noted in the margin is County A, and the body of the information
contains nothing contradicting that statement. The state's evidence,
however, discloses that although the false representation was made in
County A, title to the property passed in County B. Superficially, the
proper action to be taken by the defendant would seem to be a motion
for judgment of acquittal in conformity with rules 26.02(4) 256 and
26.102',  But once again it seems clear that defendant is only entitled
to have the case transferred to the court of County B for appropriate
action in accordance with the provisions of sections 541.120 to
541.150. Consequently, defendant's proper course of action would
be to move for such a transfer, and if he instead moves for judgment
of acquittal, the trial judge should overrule that motion and order the
transfer sua sponte. If defendant does not act at all, he will be held
to have waived his privilege of being tried where the crime was com-
mitted.
The second principal variation can best be illustrated by stating the
facts of one of the few Missouri cases raising the problem.259 An in-
formation was filed in the circuit court of the City of St. Louis charg-
ing one Cobb with committing statutory rape on a thirteen year old
girl in the City of St. Louis. The court described the state's evidence
as showing that the crime was committed in defendant's apartment at
1117a Frey Avenue, but "neither the City of St. Louis nor the State of
Missouri were mentioned in any manner in connection with the mat-
ter of venue in the state's evidence in chief." 260 At the close of the
256. Mo. R. Crim. P. 26.02(4).
257. Mo. R. Crim. P. 26.10.
258. Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 541.120-.150 (Vernon 1949).
259. State v. Cobb, 359 Mo. 373, 221 S.W.2d 745 (1949).
260. Id. at 378, 221 S.W.2d at 747.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
state's evidence, defendant moved for a directed verdict- (under the
new rules, for judgment of acquittal) -on the ground that the state
had failed to prove that the crime was committed in the City of St.
Louis. Defendant's motion was overruled, and he then offered evi-
dence which included statements by the defendant adequate to prove
that the crime, if committed, was committed in the City of St. Louis.
On appeal from his conviction, defendant assigned as error the over-
ruling of his motion for directed verdict. The Missouri Supreme
Court affirmed the cofiviction, holding that any failure on the part of
the state's evidence to show venue was waived. It is possible that the
waiver resulted merely from the fact that the defendant did not stand
on his motion for directed verdict, but instead offered evidence in his
own behalf. The court intimated as much in one part of the opinion.',
If this is the rule of the case it might work a serious hardship on the
defendant. Elsewhere, however, the court seems to treat the defect in
proof of venue as cured by the defendant's own evidence, so that the
jury was entitled to find on the whole evidence that the crime was
committed in the City of St. Louis.26 2 That interpretation is unobjec-
tionable.
Several things should be noted. If the state does not prove venue,
the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted.
In this situation, such a motion should-not be treated as a motion to
transfer, for neither the information nor the proof discloses any place
to which a transfer could properly be made. It must be admitted that
failure to prove venue in a case like Cobb is not likely to recur, but
there are cases in which there simply is inadequate evidence to prove
venue, even though the rule is that venue can be proved circumstan-
tially.263 It is in this class of cases that the impact of the constitu-
tional provision is greatest, and is seemingly insurmountable in Mis-
souri. Although such cases are rare, the use of automobiles to whisk
away potential murder or rape victims makes their occurrence more
likely.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Perhaps the clearest way to summarize what has been said is to
proceed by illustration rather than exclusively by exposition. Suppose
that the legislature has enacted the following two hypothetical sec-
tions:
1. One who has carnally known any woman not his wife by
force and against her will in any county in this state shall be im-
prisoned for not less than ten years.
261. Ibid.
262. Id. at 379, 221 S.W.2d at 747.
263. E.g., State v. McGinnis, 76 Mo. 326 (1882).
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2. One who has carnally known any woman not his wife by
force and against her will in any county in this state shall be im-
prisoned for not less than ten years, provided that he afterwards
takes up residence in a different county in this state.
It is clear that under existing Missouri law the defendant accused of
rape could be tried only in the county where he committed the rape.264
Would the presence of the second section change this in any way? The
answer is clearly no. But on what principle? That it does not define
a crime? But in a sense it does, for there could be no conviction for
its violation unless something was done which was a serious crime at
common law and which the section immediately preceding it also de-
clares criminal.
Well, why, then, could not the defendant be tried in the county of
his later acquired residence as a violator of section 2? The answer is
not that section 2 does not define a crime, but rather that it does not
define a different crime from that defined in section 1; it does not pro-
vide for additional distinctive conduct of such a nature that the legis-
lature can use that additional conduct as a basis for saying that the
rape without the move to another county is a different crime from the
rape followed by a move to that other county.
But should the statutes be read together as a rather peculiar effort
to provide alternative places of trial in rape cases? Because that
would seem to be the only sensible construction of the statute, it
would certainly be argued. If the gist rule were one of constitutional
law, the effort would clearly be held invalid. But suppose that the
legislature does have some power to vary that rule. Would the power
extend this far? The answer seems clear; it would not. Under any
view of the crime of rape, the residence of the perpetrator has no
rational relationship either to the reason for the proscription or to
the character of the conduct proscribed. It follows- then, that even
though the gist rule may be changed in some cases and under some
circumstances, the result of the change must be related to the nature
of the crime and the reasons for forbidding the conduct.
By way of contrast, suppose the following section were enacted:
Whoever, being married, either (a) goes through a second mar-
riage ceremony, or (b) goes through a second marriage ceremony
and cohabits with a person not his spouse, or (c) cohabits with a
person not his spouse, shall be guilty of bigamy.
The crime of bigamy can be regarded as committed in one of three
ways under this section: (1) merely by going through the second
marriage ceremony; (2) by cohabitation without having gone through
the second marriage ceremony; (3) by cohabitation following a sec-
264. Essentially this is true because rape is not a crime which can rationally
be broken up into parts for any purpose.
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ond marriage ceremony. Suppose that we consider only possibilities
I and 3. If the second marriage ceremony occurs in County A, and
defendant cohabitg in Counties B, C and D, may defendant be prose-
cuted only in County A? The answer seems clear. Defendant could be
prosecuted in any of the four counties. What is the essential differ-
ence? It is entirely rational to say that entry into a second marriage
by one already married is a crime, but that cohabitation following that
second marriage is an additional crime, and a more serious one. Thus
in situation 3, defendant could be prosecuted in both County A and in
any of the other three counties. (It is even arguable that he could be
prosecuted in all three of them on the theory that cohabitation in one
county is sufficiently separate from cohabitation in any other to con-
stitute a separate crime.) In effect, the legislature would have created
more than one crime out of conduct ordinarily considered a single
offense. That it has power to do so is illustrated by the legislative
decision to separate abandonment and non-support-a decision which
was sustained, even for venue purposes. 2115
But can the legislature go further? Suppose that after defining the
substantive crime of kidnapping in its usual form, the legislature pro-
vided that:
The crime of kidnapping as above defined may be prosecuted
either where the abduction takes place, or where the kidnapped
person is hidden or confined, or where the demand for ransom is
made, or where the ransom money is actually paid over.
If those elements occurred in four different counties, in which of them
could prosecution be begun without violating the constitution? The
answer here, if indeed there is one, is not so simple. It is essential to
review the theory of the cases. The basic reasoning underlying cases
announcing the constitution-based restrictive rule is essentially this:
1. Prosecution must occur where the crime was committed;
2. No statute considered in those cases specifically defined the
place of crime, but some clearly purported to place venue in
a county other than that in which the crime was committed;
3. In the cases declaring statutes unconstitutional, it was clear
that under any rule for determining situs of crimes, the crimes
were committed in a different county from that of trial;
4. In the cases in which some elements admittedly took place in
one county while others occurred in a different county, no
statute specifically stated that the part of the course of crimi-
nal conduct which occurred in the county where venue was laid
was there punishable, nor was there any general statutory sub-
stitute for the gist rule.
5. In this situation, the court could look only to common law
rules, which provided that the crime was committed where its
265. See text at notes 177-94 supra.
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gist occurred, for although there was some disagreement about
what constituted the gist of a particular crime, the courts
agreed that each crime had a gist.
6. The obvious process was, therefore, (a) determine what the
gist of the crime in question was at common law, (b) find out
whether that part of the crime occurred in the county of trial.
If it did, venue could be laid there, otherwise not.
If we view the hypothetical kidnapping statute as an effort to
change the gist rule, we may now ask whether the attempt would be
successful. The key link in the chain of reasoning is that the gist rule
was used in default of anything else which could serve as a substitute.
With the hypothetical kidnapping statute, the court could take the
position that the legislature provided that substitute. Thus it could
hold that enough of the crime of kidnapping occurred to justify trial
for the completed offense in the county where abduction took place,
or where the confinement occurred, or where the ransom demand was
made, or where the ransom was paid.
Of course, if the legislature attempted to make residence by the
defendant in some county in the state part of the crime, it is doubtful
whether trial could be had in the county of residence if none of the
other four elements occurred there. There are limits. No doubt some
"necessary," "substantial," "important," "material" element of the
criminal conduct would have to occur where venue is laid. Although
the principle seems clear, precision in stating it is more difficult.
If this were a matter of first impression in Missouri in 1958, I be-
lieve this hypothetical venue statute would be upheld. Because of the
long history discussed in this article, however, substantial arguments
that such a statute would be unconstitutional could be made. I believe
that those arguments may be overcome by focusing attention on the
key step in the reasoning underlying the Missouri cases. Resort to the
gist rule was necessary because there was no legislative declaration
to the contrary.
If we assume that the legislature could vary the gist rule by specify-
ing for each crime various venue possibilities-within the constitu-
tional limit that the part of the conduct occurring within the county of
prosecution must bear some reasonable relationship either to the rea-
son for the proscription or to the character of the conduct proscribed
-is there any reason why the legislature may not adopt a different
route to the same end? In short, could the legislature .validly enact a
general venue statute changing the gist rule but keeping the venue
variations within the constitutional limits? Again illustration is help-
ful. Many jurisdictions have statutes in approximately the following
form:
When a public offense is committed partly in one county and
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partly in another county, or the acts or effects thereof constitut-
ing or requisite to the offense occur in two or more counties, the
venue is in either county.266
Under such a statute, the court is given the basic responsibility for
determining whether on a given set of facts the crime is committed
partly in one county and partly in another. Although such statutes
have been very generally upheld,2 67 and although I believe that the
Missouri courts would declare such a statute valid, it is also true that
the cases decided under such statutes show that just as many problems
of interpretation arise under them as under the gist rule .26  I do not
believe that the enactment of such a general statute would improve
the situation in Missouri. On the other hand, it would be unwieldy to
have each separate substantive criminal statute contain its own venue
section. Furthermore, if the legislature went beyond the constitu-
tional limits in some cases, or if the whole scheme seemed uneven in
its application, further difficulties would arise.
Is there, then, no alternative? As part of a proposed model penal
code, draftsmen for the American Law Institute have recommended
to the Institute a section defining the territorial application of the
code.2619 Although this section applies to criminal conduct occurring
across state lines, it could readily be adapted to the problem of venue.
Relying then on the current draft of the American Law Institute pro-
posal, I recommend for adoption by the Missouri legislature the fol-
lowing statute:
A person may be tried and convicted of an offense against the
State of Missouri in any county thereof where he has wholly or
partly committed the offense. An offense against the State of
Missouri is committed wholly or partly within a particular county
of the State under the following circumstances:
1. If the offense consists of specified conduct but does not re-
quire either a purpose to cause or the causing of a particu-
lar result, the offense is wholly committed within a county
whenever the conduct occurs within that county.270
2. If the offense consists of specified conduct engaged in with
a purpose to cause a particular result but does not require
that result to occur, the offense is committed wholly within
266. See Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 1267, for a discussion of cases arising under
statutes of that general type.
267. Ibid.
268. Ibid.
269. Model Penal Code § 1.03 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956), hereafter cited as
"Model Penal Code."
270. The code illustrations are carrying a concealed weapon, reckless handling
of a vehicle, or reckless handling of firearms. Model Penal Code, comment to
§ 1.03.
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a county if the conduct with the requisite purpose occurs
within that county.2Y1
3. If the offense consists of specified conduct which actually
causes a particular result, the offense is committed wholly
within a county whenever the conduct and the result both
occur within that county.
4. If the law imposes a duty of performance within a county,
an offense based upon an omission to perform that duty is
committed wholly within that county regardless of where
the person is when the omission occurs.
5. If the offense consists of specified conduct which causes a
particular result, the offense is committed partly within a
county if
a. the result is caused within that county by conduct occur-
ring outside it; or
b. the result is caused outside that county by conduct within
that county if the conduct within that county constitutes
an attempt to commit the offense charged.
6. Murder or manslaughter is committed partly within a
county if
a. the bodily impact causing death occurs within that
county; or
b. conduct within that county constitutes an attempt to
commit murder or manslaughter; or
c. the victim dies within that county.
It would be absurd to assert that no problems of interpretation would
arise under the recommended statute. It is clear, however, that more
definite guide-lines would be set out for the court than by the repre-
sentative statute discussed previously. On the other hand, consistency
in principle would be accomplished, something that would be difficult
to achieve if the alternative of drafting specific venue provisions for
each substantive offense were adopted. I believe that this statute
would be upheld by the Missouri Supreme Court, and that it would
provide a sensible solution to the problems created by cases falling
into category 3-those in which there is no doubt where every part of
the total course of criminal conduct occurred, but where, at least ac-
cording to some rational view of the matter, some significant part
occurred in one county and another significant part occurred in an-
other county.
Obviously, such a statute would not reach the problems arising in
the second category of cases-those in which there is doubt-perhaps
not resolvable under ordinary burden of proof rules-where some
significant part of the total course of criminal conduct occurred. Be-
cause all attempts to solve the problem for cases in this class have
been struck down by the Missouri courts, and because those attempts
271. Obvious examples are attempts and conspiracies.
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seem to have exhausted the practical possibilities, I regard it as a mat-
ter for constitutional amendment.
Finally, it should be made clear that no attempt has been made here
to handle cases where part of the conduct occurred outside the state
and part within it. Reflection suggests, however, that under the Mis-
souri court's interpretation of the Missouri Constitution, the problem
of extraterritoriality and the problem of venue run parallel through
nearly all of their course. The statute currently under consideration
by the American Law Institute, used as a model for the venue statute
proposed herein, would seem to be admirably suited for the purpose
of defining the territorial scope of Missouri's criminal law, provided
some minor changes were made.27 2
272. Model Penal Code § 1.03.
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